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Recent changes to the American Bar Association's (ABA) accreditation
standards require law schools to adopt learning outcomes that demonstrate
competenciesfor legalpractice and to measureprogress toward this goal. Absent
from the new requirements, however, is any mention of "culture." Instead,
"cultural competence" is included as an optional skill, which law schools may
choose to identify and measure (or not). But culture is anything but optional. In
light of contributions from psychology and cognitive science, and calls from the
bench and bar, law schools can no longer avoid including culture in meaningful,
sustained, and integrated instruction throughout the curriculum. Building on
critical legal scholarship and the movement to foster cross-cultural awyering
competencies in clinical education, this article proposes culturally responsive
lawyering as a new orientingframeworkfor legal education andfor lawpractice.
Culturally responsive lawyering specifically rejects the notion that cultural
competence is an optional skill, divorcedfrom other core competencies. Rather,
culturally responsive lawyering is grounded in a deliberative process, which
extends deeper than outward-facing performative skills. Culturally responsive
lawyering acknowledges that culture and law exist in a mutually constitutive
relationship and employs both transformative legal analysis and intercultural
sensibility to meet the ethical requirements ofcompetent lawyering. In addition to
sketching a theoretical framework, this article proposes learning outcomes and
curricular strategies for culturally responsive lawyering that can be interwoven
into any law school course.
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INTRODUCTION
"[Ilfy'all, this is how I feel, ify'all think I did it, I know that I didn't do it
so why don't youjust give me a lawyer dog cause this is not what's up."
In law school, professors train their students to analyze the law, evaluate
facts, and render decisions. They teach law students that reasonable minds can
differ. But, when reasonable minds differ, what should law students (or, for that
matter, attorneys) do? What training and experience can they rely on to
determine how the law applies to a specific set of facts, in a particular context,
during a moment in time? What obligation do they have to their clients and,
more broadly, to the justice system to consider not only the legal landscape-
the "context"-but also the larger human contexts in which decisions are
made? And what obligation, if any, do law schools have to provide every law
school graduate with direct instruction and experiential learning opportunities
to foster the critical mindset and skills needed to address this complex
interplay?
These questions are not new. In fact, they have been thoroughly debated
for decades.2 Scholars and practitioners alike have conducted studies, drafted
1. State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206, 1206 (La. 2017).
2. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and Really Seriously: Before,
During and After 'The Law', 60 VAND. L. REv. 555, 560-80 (2007) (chronicling the history
of legal education reform). For examples of scholarly critiques and reform proposals, see
reports, and made recommendations.
3 At the heart of the debate for legal
education is whether law schools should teach students to "think like" lawyers
or to "be" lawyers.4 "Thinking like" lawyers has long been associated with
critical thinking and abstract reasoning.
5 But legal thinking need not and should
Sharon L. Beckman & Paul R. Tremblay, Foreword: The Way to Carnegie, 32 B.C. J.L. &
Soc. JUST. 215, 216 (2012) (arguing that the Langdellian case method "erases the context of
practice and, in doing so, fails to teach students to recognize and take account of the social,
economic, and political forces constraining the choices of others"); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw,
Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1988)
(calling for a critical collective pedagogy that centers minority student perspective and
experiences in law school classrooms); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal
Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 212-15 (1948) (describing the prevailing "case teaching"
method and critiquing its "concentrat[ion] upon subject matter at the expense of training in
craft-skills"); Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60
VAND. L. RE. 597 (2007) (arguing for the inclusion of problem-solving materials requiring
students to generate alternative solutions that include legal, normative, and practical
considerations).
3. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW
SCHOOLS (1979); ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 138-207
(1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT], https://perma.cc/R86E-KULB; Ro STUCKEY ET
AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007),
https://perma.cc/K59F-ZJMF; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION (2014),
https://perma.cc/4S9N-TX3R; see also Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic
Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 64-71 (2009); Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and
Learning Outcomes: Developing a Coherent, Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School
Curriculum, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 668-71 (2016).
4. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, What Is a Law School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701, 713 (1989)
(arguing the goal of legal education should be "to teach students to be lawyers, not just to
'think like lawyers' or 'act' like lawyers"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 559 (arguing
there is also ambiguity in the term "a" lawyer and stating there are "too many different forms
of legal practice to construct a generalizable or uniform idea of 'a' lawyer for educational
purposes").
5. See Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason":
Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (1992) ("The
prevailing image of the law is of blindfolded Justice balancing the scales of decision.
Because lack of bias or prejudice is essential to adjudication, Justice wears a blindfold to
shut out persons and passions that might inappropriately influence her inward deliberation.
Even where lawyers are advocates or advisors rather than adjudicators, the profession
emphasizes 'thinking like a lawyer."'); see also Beverly I. Moran, Disappearing Act: The
Lack of Values Training in Legal Education: A Casefor Cultural Competency, 38 S.U. L.
REV. 1, 16-17 (2011) (discussing EDUCATING LAWYERS and stating "[s]tudents discover that
thinking like a lawyer means redefining messy situations of actual or potential conflict as
opportunities for advancing a client's cause through legal argument before a judge or
through negotiation"); Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 2 (defining the dominant mode of legal
academe as "perspectivelessness").
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not be so limited.6
Warren Demesme's case makes this point loud and clear. In October 2017,
grammarians, bloggers, and lawyers alike took to the internet to hash out the
meaning of these words: "[i]f y'all, this is how I feel, if y'all think I did it, I
know that I didn't do it so why don't you just give me a lawyer dog cause this
is not what's up."7 Mr. Demesme, a criminal defendant charged with first-
degree rape and indecent behavior with a juvenile, claimed this statement was
his request for an attorney.8 The Criminal District Court for the Parish of
Orleans disagreed and denied his motion to suppress. 9 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana denied his application for a writ of certiorari
review in a 6-1 decision without written opinion.o Likely, this decision would
have faded into the archives were it not for a concurring opinion penned by
Justice Crichton.'' There, Justice Crichton concluded, "the defendant's
ambiguous and equivocal reference to a 'lawyer dog' does not constitute an
invocation of counsel that warrants termination of the interview . . . ."12
The decision and the debates that ensued illustrate the interplay between
cognition, context, culture, and the law. Memes of dogs in suits flooded Twitter
feeds. Angela Helm, writing for The Root, asserted that this decision
demonstrated how "the court system does not work for black people-
especially those who lack resources." 13 Jordana Rosenfeld, writing in The
6. See Deborah N. Archer, There Is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of Teaching the
Next Generation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a "Post-Racial" Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L.
55, 56-61 (2013) (critiquing the post-racial narrative present in the typical law school
curriculum and identifying it as part of dominant social and legal culture); Andrea A. Curcio
et al., A Survey Instrument to Develop, Tailor, and Help Measure Law Student Cultural
Diversity Education Learning Outcomes, 38 NOVA L. REV. 177, 180 (2014) (arguing that
thinking like a lawyer requires cultural sensibility); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Awayfrom the
Case Book: A Callfor Balance and Integration in Law School Pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 611, 612-13 (2008) (explaining that "thinking like a lawyer" includes mastering
doctrine, including theories related to doctrine and criticisms, and being skilled with how to
use this knowledge in context); Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to 'Think Like a Lawyer'
Enough?, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 583, 589 (1998) (suggesting that it is "possible to
discourage fuzzy thinking and sentimentalism, and to teach 'abstract hypothetical-deductive
critical thinking skills,' while at the same time raising and addressing moral issues and
encouraging humane responses to human experience").
7. State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206, 1206 (La. 2017).
8. Petition for Supervisory Writs to Review the Trial and Appellate Courts' Denial of
Mr. Demesme's Motion to Suppress Statements at 6-9, Demesme, 2017-0954 (La. Oct. 27,
2017) [hereinafter Petition].
9. Id. at 7-8.
10. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206.
11. Id. at 1206 (Crichton, J., concurring) (agreeing Mr. Demesme's request for an
attorney was ambiguous).
12. Id. at 1207.
13. Angela Helm, La. Court Rules That Man Who Said 'Give Me a Lawyer, Dog'
Wasn't Askingfor Counsel, RooT (Nov. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/W96J-5LLK.
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Nation, argued that the decision reflected the continued refusal of the U.S. legal
system to acknowledge language outside of Standard American English, which
results in "the unfair treatment of an individual based solely on the
characteristics of their speech."1 4
The decision made its way through legal circles as well. 15 Scholars
questioned whether the transcription of Mr. Demesme's quote fairly captured
his intent or whether "the transcript didn't do the request justice."'
6 IfMr.
Demesme paused and said "dawg," then perhaps his request was clear: "why
don't you just give me a lawyer, dawg."" Or perhaps the ambiguity wasn't in
the word "dog" but in the "conditional" statement that proceeded it: "if y'all
think I did it."" According to the State of Louisiana, Mr. Demesme never
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel because his statement suggested he
only wanted an attorney if the interrogating officers thought he was guilty.
1 9
Under this analysis, "[a] reasonable officer under the circumstances would have
understood, as [the] Detective ... did, that the defendant only might be
invoking his right to counsel."20 Therefore, denying his motion to suppress
wasn't "obviously wrong."21
But does that somehow make it right? The result in Mr. Demesme's case
was severe: If he invoked an attorney with those words, nothing he said after
would be admissible in court. On the other hand, if those words weren't a
14. Jordana Rosenfeld, In the Legal System, Talking White Is a Precursor to Justice-
and That's Wrong, NATION (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/5HNN-WHAM.
15. See, e.g., Holly Howell, Improper Grammar and Our Modern Day Vernacular
Collide Raising Questions About Whether One Louisiana Man's Fifth Amendment Rights
Were Violated, A. J. TRIAL ADvoc. (2019), https://perma.cc/ZZF6-D7TP; Norman Tabler,
The Unspeakable Comma, 65 FED. LAW. 18, 18 (2018); Elie Mystal, Suspect Asks for a
'Lawyer, Dog,' Willfully Ignorant Court Denies Comma, Counsel, ABOVE THE LAW, (Oct.
30, 2017), https://perma.cc/NF6G-52GH; see also Orin Kerr, The Lawyer Dog' Decision
Isn't Obviously Wrong, WASH.PosT (Nov. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/6G38-UTSH; Eugene
Volokh, Opinion, You Have the Right to Askfor a Lawyer Dog - But It Won't Do You Any
Good, WASH. PosT (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/G4JS-8Q3T. See generally Christopher
A. Hebert, Note, Context is King: Lawyer Dogs, Pure Applesauce, and Your Miranda Right
to Counsel, 92 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2018).
16. Volokh, supra note 15.
17 . Kerr, supra note 15. Hyperlinking to the definition of "dawg" on
urbandictionary.com, Kerr writes, "[t]he funny part ofDemesme, of course, is that there's a
sentence in the opinion suggesting that Crichton may have misunderstood the vernacular
'dawg,' roughly meaning 'friend,' as if it meant 'dog' as in the animal." Id.
18. Id. Kerr noted that the ambiguity wasn't in the word "dog," but in the "conditional"
statement that proceeded it. According to Kerr, Mr. Demesme's use of conditional phrasing
("if y'all think I did it") and his subsequent question ("so why don't you get me a lawyer")
make the Davis test determination a close call.
19. Opposition to Defendant's Original Writ Application at 7-8, State v. Demesme,
228 So. 3d 1206 (2017) (No. 2017-0954).
20. Id. at 8.
21. Kerr, supra note 15.
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request for counsel, then anything he said after could be introduced at trial and
used against him. For Mr. Demesme, the exercise wasn't academic-and it
certainly wasn't funny. Law, for most who experience it, is seldom either.
Legal education is partly to blame for the deft combination of willful
blindness and technical parsing used to deny Mr. Demesme's writ. For too
long, law schools have perpetuated the notion that lawyers and judges merely
call "balls and strikes," immune from bias and subjectivity.2 2 Further, first year
courses-taught almost exclusively from edited appellate decisions-gloss
over human context, both flattening and distorting the law's development and
its interpretation by focusing on black letter law to the exclusion of most
everything else.23
There is hope. Recent changes made to the Standards and Rules governing
law school accreditation (the ABA Revised Standards)24 finally reflect an
understanding that preparing students to participate in the legal profession as
effective, ethical, and responsible lawyers requires competencies that go far
beyond legal knowledge. At their most basic, the ABA Revised Standards
require law schools to evaluate their curricula and instructional methods and to
ensure that students meet minimum knowledge, skills, and values
competencies. But as Mr. Demesme's case makes clear, law schools should do
more than this: They should reimagine their curricula to make certain their
students are prepared to fulfill their ethical duty to "seek improvement of the
law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of
service rendered by the legal profession."25 Clinical and critical legal theory
scholars have been making this plea for decades, yet first-year required courses
have remained largely unchanged.
Building on the movement to foster cross-cultural lawyering competencies
22. Roberts: 'My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,' CNN (Sept.
12, 2005), https://perma.cc/FAE5-PMHG; see also Kevin Bennardo, Abandoning
Predictions, 16 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 39, 43 (2019) (noting that judges are "all-too-
human workers," who "cannot be counted on to apply legal rules to the facts in a purely
mechanical manner").
23. See Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client as Subject: Humanizing the Legal Curriculum,
23 CLIN. L. REV. 37, 39-42 (noting that students encounter "prospective clients from the
perspective of institutions far removed from ordinary human existence-appellate courts");
Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1196 n.226 (2008) (stating
legal reasoning "privileges technical form and levels of legal authority over social contexts
and moral issues"); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1735-36 (1993) ("The arguments the students make, arrived at entirely
without reference to the clients, are determined by and confined within structures of
argumentation that reflect the available and acceptable categories of legal analysis.").
24. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2017-2018, https://perma.cc/9KRG-
9QNJ [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
25. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. 6 (2015).
207THE CULTURAL (RE)TURN
in clinical and experiential teaching, and harnessing reform momentum spurred
by the learning outcome requirements, this Article proposes that law schools
adopt a new conceptual framework-culturally responsive lawyering-to
ground curricular reforms. The term "culturally responsive lawyering" is
inspired by the work of education scholars who have been developing
pedagogy and curricula aimed at transforming the educational experiences of
students of color in the U.S.26 Culturally responsive lawyering is not cultural
competence repackaged. It is much more. Like the critical pedagogy that
inspired its connection to law, culturally responsive lawyering is not a
prescriptive program but a way of thinking about, interacting with, and
practicing law that supports dignity, equity, and systemic transformation. To
this end, the culturally responsive lawyering framework includes three tenets.
Culturally responsive lawyering: (1) accepts that culture and law exist in a
mutually constitutive relationship; (2) utilizes transformative legal analysis
27 -
a reconceptualized approach to traditional legal analysis that specifically
evaluates how culture, context, and cognition affect what the law is and
encourages law students and practitioners to make normative assertions about
what the law should be; and (3) employs this transformative legal analysis
along with inter-cultural sensibility in the provision of legal services or when
otherwise operating within the legal profession.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Prior to sketching the three tenets of
culturally responsive lawyering, Part I defines "culture" and summarizes how
culture and social cognition interact. It then briefly describes the inclusion of
"culture work" in legal scholarship and pedagogy. Here, "culture work" refers
to the various ways that culture is explored and taught in law schools. Culture
work encapsulates the inclusion of culture in theoretical legal studies
26. See generally GENEVA GAY, CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE TEACHING: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2018) (collecting works that explore the development of
culturally responsive pedagogy through theory, research, scholarship, and practice);
ZARETTA L. HAMMOND, CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE TEACHING AND THE BRAIN: PROMOTING
AUTHENTIC ENGAGEMENT AND RIGOR AMONG CULTURALLY AND LINGUISTICALLY DIVERSE
STUDENTS (2015). According to Hammond, culturally responsive teaching (CRT)
"[e]mphasizes communal orientation focused on relationships, cognitive scaffolding, and
critical social awareness." Id. at 156. Hammond approaches CRT not as a prescriptive
program, but as a "way of thinking about and organizing instruction to allow for great
flexibility in teaching." Id. at 5. To date, the term culturally responsive lawyering has not
been adopted by the legal profession. But see Debra Chopp et al., Arguing on the Side of
Culture, LITIG. J. (MICH.), Fall 2014, at 10-13 (describing culturally responsive professional
practice as including four components: knowledge, awareness, affective or cultural
sensitivity, and the integration of "professional and cultural knowledge and skills").
27. The term "transformative legal analysis" is inspired by the work of legal writing
and rhetoric scholar Professor Lucy Jewel, who wrote: "The law is not just a static system of
rules to be studied; rather, students and practitioners engage in a dynamic intellectual
enterprise of remixing and reconstituting precedential legal texts, with the goal of forging
new and transformative legal meanings." Lucy Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law:
Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 680 (2017).
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scholarship and in competence, sensibility and awareness frameworks taught
primarily through clinical education. Part II critiques the requirements imposed
on law schools by revised ABA Standard 301, which lays out the Program of
Legal Education's Objectives, and Standard 302, which establishes Learning
Outcomes and Minimum Competencies.2 8 It argues that although the ABA
Guidance for Standard 302 includes "cultural competence" as an optional
"other professional skill[]," the inclusion of "culture" here belies the powerful
influence that culture has on law, law practice and legal systems, and
undermines adopting culture work throughout the legal curriculum. Part III
sketches out the three tenets of culturally responsive lawyering in addition to
proposing learning outcomes aligned with these tenets. Part IV returns to the
article's opening scene and considers how a law student or lawyer might begin
to think through Mr. Demesme's case using the tenets of culturally responsive
lawyering. The Article concludes by calling on law schools and their faculty to
situate culture at the heart of legal education and law practice by adopting
culturally responsive lawyering as a guiding framework. In addition to
supporting students' ability to demonstrate the minimum competencies outlined
in ABA Standard 302, the tenets of culturally responsive lawyering foster
ethical practice, enhance the legal profession, and advance equity and justice.
I. WHAT'S CULTURE GOT To DO WITH IT?
"[C]ulture is everywhere invoked and virtually nowhere explained."29
A. Culture Defined
Despite (or perhaps because of) the term's adoption across disciplines, a
concrete definition of culture is both contested and elusive.3 0 For the purposes
of describing culturally responsive lawyering, this article adopts the definition
proposed by Professor Naomi Mezey in "Law as Culture."3 Culture, then, is
28. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24.
29. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35 (2001).
30. See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation ofLegal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 15-16
(2001) (noting "culture" has ascended in legal scholarship while at the same time "[talking
about culture at the start of the twenty-first century means venturing into a field where there
are almost as many definitions of the term as there are discussions of it, and where
arguments rage inside as well as outside the academy"); see also Verlyn F. Francis, Infusing
Dispute Resolution Teaching and Training with Culture & Diversity, 33 OHIO ST. J. DIsP.
RESOL. 171, 180-96 (2018) (outlining what culture is not); Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-Cultural
Lawyering by the Book: The Latest Clinical Texts and a Sketch of a Future Agenda, 4
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131, 134-35 (2006) (noting "[s]everal disciplines, such as
cultural anthropology and sociology, are devoted in part to the task [of defining culture] and
[are] deeply divided in the effort").
31. Mezey, supra note 29, at 42. For this definition, Professor Mezey drew from the
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"any set of shared, signifying practices-practices by which meaning is
produced, performed, contested or transformed."
32 While demographic markers
are routinely used to define the variables that constitute culture,
33 no single
characteristic or membership determines a person's culture. Each person
embodies and reflects multiple cultures and each culture generates its own
values, customs, and traditions.34 Additionally, the very act of naming and
categorizing constituent parts of "culture" belies its dynamism. By naming its
parts, we lose sight of the role people play in defining and shaping culture. 
35
Legal culture is one such culture. 36 As with any macro-cultural
work of Raymond Williams and William Sewell. See id. at 38-45 (discussing "culture").
32. Id. at 42-43 (proposing this definition for the term "culture" and expressly
describing culture as both a semiotic system and as the practices that make, reproduce, and
contest this system, and arguing that rather than a "self-contained whole made up of coherent
patterns," culture is "porous" and fluid).
33. For example, narrow definitions of culture may include only ethnicity or
nationality, whereas broader definitions include additional demographic variables. See Neil
Hamilton & Jeff Maleska, Helping Students Develop Affirmative Evidence of Cross-Cultural
Competency, 19 SCHOLAR 187, 188-89 (2017) (listing age, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, physical ability, nationality, religion, and socio-economic group, and
acknowledging that sharing a category does not equate with sharing a culture or experience).
See generally Christina A. Zawisza, Teaching Cross-Cultural Competence to Law Students:
Understanding the 'Self as 'Other', 17 FLA. COASTALL. REv. 185 (2016) (discussing results
from exercises conducted with legal academics and law clinic students and adding categories
such as politics, profession, geography, and generation).
34. See Debra Chopp, Addressing Cultural Bias in the Legal Profession, 41 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 367, 368 (2017) (noting "we are each a part of several cultures, and
each culture generates its own norms"); Leslie G. Espinoza, Solidarity, Inclusion, and
Representation: Tensions and Possibilities Within Contemporary Feminism, 2 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 23, 24-27 (1994) (discussing how language reflects culture and how an
individual can belong to multiple overlapping subcultures); Piomelli, supra note 30, at 135
(noting we each belong "to multiple cultures-some of which we choose, some to which
others assign us"); Zawisza, supra note 33, at 194 ("Every person assumes hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of culturally learned identities and affiliations at one time or another.").
See generally Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1244-45 (1991) (explaining
intersectional identity theory and "highlight[ing] the need to account for multiple grounds of
identity when considering how the social world is constructed").
35. See Milton J. Bennett, The Ravages of Reification: Considering the Iceberg and
Cultural Intelligence, Towards De-reifying Intercultural Competence, Keynote Presentation
for the Forum for Intercultural Learning and Exchange (Sept. 28, 2013),
https://perma.cc/D7YW-K779 (noting that "[w]henever we talk about culture as if it is a
thing, we are neglecting our authorship ofthe construct").
36. See Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering, in
RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY & LAW 47, 48 (Kimberly Holt Barrett & William H. George
eds., 2005); see also James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1985) (describing a lawyer's rhetorical
life as always culturally situated). Legal institutions and other entities (inside and outside of
law) can also have "culture." Additionally, as Naomi Mezey notes, "[1]aw can be seen as one
(albeit very powerful) institutional cultural actor whose diverse agents (legislators, judges,
civil servants, citizens) order and reorder meanings." Mezey, supra note 29, at 45.
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identification, legal culture contains myriad micro-cultures. These micro-
cultures can be affected by geography and practice area.3 7 Law school and legal
curricula also produce and affect culture because, as Professor Leslie Espinoza
recognized over twenty-five years ago, "[1]aw school is where the power and
possibilities of law are learned."38
Although an imperfect metaphor, culture is like a river.39 Made up of water
molecules, a river is "constrained by its banks but at the same time slowly
carving those banks in different ways."40 Tearing away rock and soil, a river
changes slowly over time. At any given moment, whether viewed from 30,000
feet or from a perch along its bank, a river appears fairly stable.41 So too with
culture. People perceive and internalize culture through a process of
assimilation to their human and natural environments.4 2 Like a river, people
also affect their culture(s)-altering its shape, density, and course over time.43
Culture, described this way, is influenced by and influences social
cognition, the embedded knowledge structures in the human brain.4 4 Working
in the background at the subconscious level, these structures and the processes
37. See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering,
Culture and Place, 18 CLIN. L. REv. 183 (2011) (discussing how culture influences
lawyering within communities ofpractice).
38. Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 23, 28 (1994). Professor Espinoza explains that traditional law teaching exposes students
to "a whole new way of thinking, of categorizing and conceptualizing information. They
learn: to think of problems as issues, divorced from emotion; to think of justice in terms of
economic cost-benefit analysis; to think of judging as the application of preset rules; to
evaluate power; and to speak in the language that will be heard by the law." Id at 30.
39. See Bennett, supra note 35 (proposing and explaining this metaphor). Various other
metaphors have been employed to capture culture's essence. Susan Bryant and Jean Koh
Peters, in their ground-breaking article on the Five Habits, wrote "culture is like the air we
breathe-it is largely invisible and yet we are dependent on it for our very being." Susan
Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lavyers, 8 CLN. L. REv. 33, 40 (2001). Prominent socialist Edward T. Hall analogized
culture to an iceberg, where readily perceived physical characteristics like skin color and
gender exist above the waterline and represent only a small portion of factors that comprise a
society's (or a person's) culture. This metaphor has been widely adopted and critiqued. See,
e.g., Jayne Seminare Docherty, Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology for
Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 711, 712 (2003) (noting widespread adoption and suggesting
that the model can be misleading).
40. Bennett, supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. See Bryant & Peters, supra note 36, at 48 (noting "[c]ulture is the logic through
which we give meaning to the world"); Chopp, supra note 34, at 372 ("People learn their
culture through a process of assimilation, which entails learning and internalizing group
preferences, evaluations, and values.").
43. See Piomelli, supra note 30, at 135 ("One might thus analogize culture to a current
that we and other members of our social group[s] move with, or against, and occasionally
even redirect, as we strive to make sense of and act in the world.").
44. See Bennett, supra note 35 ("[S]eeing cultural difference is a function of
employing observational categories that have been constructed by us human beings.").
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through which they filter, store, and use information have a profound effect on
the study and practice of law. The categories and schemas we rely on to create
our realities are the same schema that influence law making and interpretation.
As a result, social cognition affects how law students, lawyers, and judges
understand client issues, interpret legal standards, and imagine solutions. For
example, as Professor Chen and Hansen explain, legal disputes routinely come
down to a question of categorization. "Is a business a partnership? Is a person a
public figure? Is an employee a servant? Is a work environment hostile? Is a
corporation a person? Is a fetus a human being? Is separate equal?" 
45
Answering these questions competently requires that law students and legal
professionals consider culture, context, and cognition. The Subpart below
briefly describes social cognition and then discusses how legal scholarship and
pedagogy have incorporated (or failed to incorporate) both culture and social
cognition theory into legal education.
B. Social Cognition, Culture Work, and Law
During the past two decades, numerous studies in the fields of cognitive
science, social psychology, and neuroscience have demonstrated that the
organizing structure of the human brain sorts, interprets, and categorizes
information.46 Unbeknownst to the thinker, the brain uses schema and mapping
rules to make sense of incoming information.
4 7 Schema work like a mental
blueprint. As Professor Linda Berger explains, they "sort and organize our
experiences and acquired knowledge of the world, plugging them into slots in
an existing framework and allowing us to assess new situations and ideas
without having to interpret and construct a diagram of inferences and
relationships for the first time." 48 In short, these embedded knowledge
45. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence ofKnowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1103, 1239 (2004).
46. For a review of the scientific research on social cognition, see MAHZARIN R.
BANAJL & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 78-87
(2013). See also Chen & Hanson, supra note 45, at 1103 (describing schemas, categories,
and human cognition and exploring their role in legal scholarship and theory); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1499-1504 (2005) (describing how racial
meanings, racial categories, and mapping rules create racial schemas).
47. Chen & Hanson, supra note 45, at 1133-35; see also Linda H. Edwards, Telling
Stories in the Supreme Court: Voices Briefs and the Role ofDemocracy in Constitutional
Deliberation, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 60 (2017) ("[A] schema does its world-creating
work before we become aware of the information it organizes."); Pamela A. Wilkins,
Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors'
Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 305, 317-18 (2012) (explaining schemas and
schematic thinking).
48. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision
Making: A Rhetorical Analysis ofMetaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody
Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009); see also Andrea A. Curcio, Addressing
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structures influence perception, interpretation, and behavior. As a result, they
impact and are impacted by culture.4 9
Although slow to apply these findings to law, legal scholars have produced
a recent surge of scholarship on implicit social cognition.o For example, legal
scholars have explored the role of implicit bias in jury selection and
sentencing,5 ' jury and judicial decision-making,52 immigration proceedings,53
Barriers to Cultural Sensibility Learning: Lessons from Social Cognition Theory, 15 NEV.
L.J. 537, 545-47 (2015).
49. See Lisa W. Rozas & Joshua Miller, Discourses for Social Justice Education: The
Web of Racism and the Web of Resistance, 18 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SOC.
WORK 24, 28-29 (2009) ("people enter a world in which their social identity [race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.] influences what they are taught, how they are
treated, and to what information and opportunities they are exposed."); see also Jewel, supra
note 23, at 663 ("Culture can produce unified categories that function as metaphorical 'code'
for more implicit concepts. For example, when we use the category 'unwed mother' or
'working mother,' our mind quickly latches onto the majoritarian cultural values associated
with these categories."); Wilkins, supra note 47, at 330 (noting that schemas change over
time with cultural shifts).
50. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across
the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1563 (2013) (discussing the potential effect of
implicit bias in legal proceedings); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding
of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 799-80 (2000)
(arguing that "the mental image of a prototypical case can alter legal categories); Curcio,
supra note 48, at 552-53 (explaining confirmation bias and bias blind spot bias); Lorie M.
Graham & Stephen M. McJohn, Cognition, Law, Stories, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 255,
255-57, nn.1-16 (2008) (citing scholarship that applies cognitive science to diverse areas of
law); Kang, supra note 46, at 1536-37 (discussing explicit bias and setting out a research
agenda for exploring the nexus between law and racial mechanics); L. Song Richardson,
Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267 (2012)
(discussing fundamental attribution error); Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008) (discussing impact of "false
consensus bias" on contract formation and interpretation); Christine M. Venter, The Case
Against Oral Argument: The Effects ofConfirmation Bias on the Outcome ofSelected Cases
in the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals, 14 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 45 (2017)
(describing empirical study exploring impact of confirmation bias on oral argument).
51. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124
(2012) (discussing possible interventions to counter judge and jury bias); Anna Roberts,
(Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection ofImplicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV.
827, 830 (2012) (critiquing proposals to use the IAT to screen and educate jurors); Wilkins,
supra note 47, at 311-12 (discussing effect and mitigation of implicit bias in capital
sentencing); M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, Mo. L. REV. 301, 306 (2018) (explaining how
cognitive biases may affect judges when deciding whether to credit remorse in sentencing
decisions).
52. See. e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of the Negativity Bias, 14 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC:
JALWD 1, 2-3 (2017) (reporting study of negativity bias and judicial decision making); Sara
Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of Plain-
Language Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 646 (2013); Justin D. Levinson, Mark
W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study ofJudicial
Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 63 (2017) (discussing study of 239 judges that found greater
implicit and explicit bias against Asians and Jews than Whites and Christians); Justin D.
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and employment discrimination5 4 --
USt to name a few. In response to this
scholarship, numerous local bar journals have published articles calling for
implicit bias and cultural competence training.
5 5 Additionally, law firms, The
National State Judges Association, the American Bar Association, and law
schools have provided trainings to familiarize law students, lawyers, and judges
with implicit association. 56 Recently, courts have also begun to consider
implicit bias in judicial decisions
57 and some judges now include information
about implicit bias in their jury instructions. 
5 8 Finally, lawyers seem to be
acknowledging what social psychologists have long argued: "even the most
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering,
57 DUKE L.J. 345, 347 (2007) ("Judges and jurors may unintentionally and automatically
'misremember' facts in racially biased ways during all facets of the legal decision-making
process.").
53. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 417, 419 (2011) (arguing that the current structure for adjudicating immigration matters
exacerbates biased decisions).
54. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010) (exploring bias in the workplace through
raced and gendered grooming regulations); Kang et al., supra note 51, at 1152-69
(discussing how implicit bias might affect a federal employment discrimination lawsuit).
55. See, e.g., Yasir Billoo, Implicit Bias and Its Application in the Life of a Lawyer,
FLA. B. J., https://perma.cc/K638-6NUZ; Kenneth v. Desmond, Jr., The Road to Race and
Implicit Bias Eradication, Bos. B.J. (2016), https://perma.cc/UD78-LCWH; Michael B.
Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 40 (2014); Nelson P. Miller, Beyond
Bias-Cultural Competence as a Lawyer Skill, 87 MICH. B.J. 38, 38 (2008); Ortega et al.,
supra note 26, at 10-13.
56. Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IowA L. REV. 2235,
2238 (2017) (listing entities that have sponsored or offered implicit bias trainings).
57. See id (discussing Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015), and the inclusion of "unconscious prejudices and
disguised animus" as a reason for holding that disparate impact claims are legally cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act); see also United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 553 (3d
Cir. 2017) (relying on a 2013 report by the Sentencing Project that "remarked on research
indicating that police are more likely to stop, and arrest, people of color due to implicit bias"
and holding that the lower court's consideration of the defendant's bare arrest record when
imposing his sentence was plain error). But see Sherri Lee Keene, Stories that Swim
Upstream: Uncovering the Influence ofStereotypes and Stock Stories in Fourth Amendment
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 76 MD. L. REV. 747, 752 (2017) (noting that there has been
less focus on "how courts might address implicit biases that are more firmly rooted in laws
and procedures").
58 . See, eg., ADMIN. OFF. ILL. CTs., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 1.08,
https://perma.cc/7C5F-FJF2; see also Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Can
Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions ofImplicit Bias?: New Questions Following a Test




2 OBias.ashx; Marella Gayla,
A Federal Court Asks Jurors to Confront Their Hidden Biases, MARSHALL PROJ. (Jun. 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/RJ4U-HKR5 (describing efforts by judges in the U.S. District Court
of the Western District of Washington to address juror bias by showing prospective jurors a
video about unconscious bias).
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well-meaning person unwittingly allows unconscious thoughts and feelings to
influence seemingly objective decisions."5 9
Like the scholarship on social cognition, the concept of "culture" has also
become embedded in many aspects of legal scholarship in the last two
decades. 60 Writing in 2011, Menachem Mautner identified no fewer than
twelve approaches in legal scholarship that connect law and culture.61 At its
core, each approach struggles with identifying and explaining the relationship
between law and people. Critical Race, Feminist, LatCrit, and Queer legal
theory scholars have also explored this relationship and added a critique of
"legal culture" as well as a call to amplify outsider voices.6 2 The import of this
inquiry-for legal scholarship and law practice-cannot be overstated.
59. Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethicalAre You?, HARV. Bus. REv., Dec. 2003,
at 56.
60. See generally Symposium, Approaches to the Cultural Study ofLaw, 13 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 3 (2001); see also Annette Demers, Cultural Competence and the Legal
Profession: An Annotated Bibliography ofMaterials Published Between 2000 and 2011, 39
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 22 (2011); Imani Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and
Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REv. 915, 915-23 (2005) (encouraging the use of
cultural studies methods to examine race, law, and power). Predating this recent scholarship,
in the late 1960s, the Law and Society (or socio-legal studies) movement emerged as a
multidisciplinary group of scholars who studied law and legal institutions in context. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 569-70.
61. Menachem Mautner, The Future ofLegal Theory: Three Approaches to Law and
Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 839, 841 (2011). Of those twelve, Mautner described three
"major" approaches in detail. The first category theorizes that law is a product ofa nation's
culture. Id. Mautner traces this approach to the codification movement and specifically to the
German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who proffered that law is made from culture
embedded in daily practices. Id. at 844-48. As a result, statutes do not create new law, but
they reflect existing social practices. Id. at 845. Influenced by the cultural studies movement,
the second category, the constitutive approach, posits that law participates in the constitution
of culture. Id. at 841. Mautner locates the third approach in twentieth century Anglo-
American jurisprudence. Id. Discussing Karl Llewellyn, Stanley Fish, James Boyd White,
and Pierre Bourdieu, Mautner describes the third approach as one in which the law of the
courts forms and operates as a distinct cultural system. Id. at 856-67. Under this approach, a
legal culture exists, and it both structures and constrains law and the practice of law.
62. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding Depolicing: Symbiosis Theory and
Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REv. 355, 355-57 (2002) (merging doctrinal analysis,
cultural studies, and identity theory to analyze how discourse around policing practices
results in depolicing); Bridget J. Crawford et al., Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist
Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REv. 167, 181-82
(2018) (explaining how the feminist judgments project bridges the gap between legal theory
and practice and shows how "careful attention to issues of gender, race, sexuality, and other
aspects of individual identity can be incorporated into judicial decisions while still following
precedent"); Sarudzayi M. Matambanadzo et al., Afterword: Kindling the Programmatic
Production of Critical and Outsider Legal Scholarship, 37 WHITrIER L. REv. 439 (2016)
(reflecting on the evolution and development of LatCrit theory); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 2, at 575-76 (discussing the influence of 'outsider jurisprudence' on legal scholarship
and pedagogy); Francisco Valdes, Afterword & Prologue: Queer Legal Theory, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 344 (1995).
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Whether law reflects a nation's culture or law and culture exist in a dialectic,
law is not a value-free or value-neutral mechanism. Nor is law static.
63 Rather,
law and culture are mutually constitutive. Together they are engaged in a
symbiotic meaning-making process: law shapes social practices and social
practices give rise to law.64
Complementing the law and cultural studies movement, rhetoric and
narrative theory scholars, particularly in the Legal Writing discipline, have
relied on discourse analysis to unearth law's dynamism and to critique
pedagogy. For example, a rich body of scholarship investigates the interplay
between culture, metaphor, narrative, and persuasion. 65 Employing
communication and linguistic theory, others have investigated how legal
writing pedagogy contributes to muting outsider voices. 66 Legal Writing
63. See Jewel, supra note 27, at 679-81 (discussing how the common law is both
dynamic and recursive); White, supra note 36, at 691 ("[T]he process of law is at once
creative and educative. Those who use this language are perpetually learning what can and
cannot be done with it as they try-and fail or succeed-to reach new formulations of their
positions.").
64. See Mezey, supra note 29, at 46 (describing the relationship between culture and
law as "dynamic, interactive, and dialectical" and asserting that "law is both a producer of
culture and an object of culture"); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth
Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L.
REv. 851, 861-69 (2002) (applying cultural studies and discourse analysis to explore how the
drug war encodes and decodes and investigating this meaning-making relationship).
65. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor and
Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 275 (2011) (exploring culture, metaphor, and
persuasion); Bruce Ching, Argument, Analogy, and Audience: Using Persuasive
Comparisons While Avoiding Unintended Effects, 7 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
311, 311-16 (2010) (discussing the connection between audience familiarity and effective
analogy); Lindsay Head, Standing (Near)by Things Decided: The Rhetorical and Cultural
Identifications ofLaw, 15 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 189, 191 (2018) (discussing the import
of rhetorical culture to law and law practice); Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Rhetoric ofSissy-
Slogans: How Denigrating the Feminine Perpetuates the Terror Wars, 15 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 503, 504-08 (2012); Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J.
573, 586 (2018) (using narrative theory to discuss master narratives as legal principles); J.
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, LEGAL
WRITING 53, 55-56 (2008); see also Graham and McJohn, supra note 50, at 281 (suggesting
that including the cognitive role of stories would broaden legal reasoning).
66. See, e.g., Anthonyv. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty
Law Essay, 121 HARV. L. REv. 805, 810-12 (2008) (discussing cultural and social difference
in classrooms and client representation); Leslie P. Culver, Conscious Identity Performance,
55 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 577, 579 (2018) (discussing how "nondominant cultures communicate
and negotiate their identity within dominant structures"); Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School
Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric
Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 39, 50 (2016) (arguing that "discriminatory legal
categories" can work "in favor of the dominant group but not at all for those left outside at
the margins"); Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law
Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 1155, 1156-
59 (2008); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy
Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REv. 7, 9-10
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scholars have also written about the need to examine and confront bias in
language and legal analysis.67
While critical legal scholars proposed theoretical methods of cultural
inquiry and rhetoric scholars employed discourse analysis to engage law as
text, across campus another movement gained traction. Spurred by funding
from the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, in the
1960s, a handful of law schools created legal clinics to serve low-income
clients. 68 Clinics were not quickly or universally embraced,69 but the clinical
movement steadily carved out a place in the legal academy.70 Now, clinics can
be found in nearly every ABA-accredited law school,7 and under the Revised
ABA Standards students must complete at least six credit hours of experiential
learning to graduate with a law degree.7 2
Along with creating clinics, professors developed robust scholarship to
(1998).
67. See, e.g., Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and
(Un)Intended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and
Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Elizabeth E. Berenguer, The Color of
Fear: A Cognitive-Rhetorical Analysis ofHow Florida's Subjective Fear Standard in Stand
Your Ground Cases Ratifies Racism, 76 MD. L. REV. 726, 727 (2017); Charles R. Calleros,
Training a Diverse Student Bodyfor a Multicultural Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 160 (1995)
(observing that "professors should be aware of the biases and limitations of their cultural
perspectives and should carefully consider the potential merits of a fresh perspective before
rejecting an invitation to explore it further"); Keene, supra note 57, at 751-52 (discussing
role of implicit bias in judicial review of police officer decision-making); Teri A. McMurtry-
Chubb, The Practical Implications of Unexamined Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal
Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 531, 560-65 (2019)
(discussing findings from six-year empirical study offirst-year legal writing students).
68. Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of
Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1934 (2002) (explaining that the initial goal of these
newly-created legal clinics was "to get students out of the classroom into the real world of
law, from which they would return to the classroom with a deeper understanding of how
legal doctrine and legal theory actually work-or don't work").
69. Jane Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 997, 999 (2004) ("Clinicians
were a different breed from their law professor counterparts. They were often housed in
different spaces, not allowed to participate in faculty governance, and offered no job
security. Indeed, many, if not most, clinicians had to raise funds to ensure their own job
continuation.").
70. See Margaret Martin Berry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The
Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) ("While student demands for relevance in the
law school curriculum and the social ferment of the 1960's played an important role in
spurring the growth of clinical programs, it was the development of a clinical teaching
methodology that was critical in solidifying the place of clinical legal education in the law
school curriculum during the period running from the 1970's through the present.").
71. See id. at 30; Rebecca Sandefur& Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICALL.
REV. 58, 77-78 (2009) (describing the substantial expansion of law school clinics).
72. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24; see also Chopp, supra note 34, at 380 (noting
that this requirement substantially increases the previous single credit requirement).
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support clinical teaching including initial frameworks for teaching cultural
competence in experiential courses. In fact, clinical professors have been
arguing for decades that cultural competence is a fundamental lawyering skill.
73
This deeply influential culture work has transformed clinical education over the
past two decades.74 From Professor Michelle S. Jacobs' 1997 article critiquing
clinical education's failure to address (or even mention) the challenges of
providing legal assistance in cross-cultural interactions, and Professor Sue
Bryant's seminal piece on The Five Habits, to Professor Carwina Weng's early
call to teach social psychology and cognition to clinic students, clinical
pedagogy has widely embraced cross-cultural lawyering as a cornerstone of
clinical instruction.75
Although this development has not been uniform, certain concepts and
pedagogical practices have become widely adopted.
7 Early scholarship, for
example, focused on preparing law students to work with clinic clients whose
life experiences and backgrounds were different from their own.
77 These early
73. See, e.g., Alexis Anderson et al., Challenges of "Sameness": Pitfalls and Benefits
to Assumed Connections in Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REv. 339, 343 (2012) (discussing
"multicultural competence"); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Culture
Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 33, 35-36 (2001); Carolyn Copps Hartley &
Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A
Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 136 (2004);
Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Making and Breaking Habits: Teaching (and Learning) Cultural
Context, Self-Awareness, and Intercultural Communication Through Case Supervision in a
Client-Service Legal Clinic, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 38-39 (2008); Mary A. Lynch, An
Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 976, 1004-05 (2012); Piomelli, supra note 30, at 133 (analyzing how clinical
textbooks prepare students for cross-cultural work); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and
Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 373, 377-78 (2002);
Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-
Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REv. 369, 372-73 (2005).
74. Although described as two separate scholarship streams, work emanating from the
critical legal studies and clinical movements share synergies. Writing in the early 1990s,
Phyllis Goldfarb identified the overlap between CLS's desire to "reveal the inherent
indeterminacy of the categories and values underlying legal thought" and the clinical
movement's concern with "illuminat[ing] the assumptions, biases, values, and norms
embedded in law's workings in order to heighten awareness of the political and moral
choices made by lawyers and the legal system." Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers:
Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 722
(1992).
75. Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 345 (1997); Bryant, supra note 73; Weng,
supra note 73.
76. See generally Piomelli, supra note 30 (assessing how five clinical legal textbooks
published between 1997 and 2006 address cross-cultural work and highlighting the
differences in content).
77. See Anderson et al., supra note 73, at 343 (noting issues of "sameness" and "the
influence of interpersonal dynamics when sameness, actual or perceived, exists between
lawyer and client[]" have received less attention in clinical scholarship and pedagogy).
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attempts at addressing "culture" in clinical education focused largely on the
client's culture and encouraged law students to "generalize and stereotype
without ever questioning their own internally-held beliefs."7 Such an approach
perpetuated narratives that stigmatize individual clients and flatten their
multidimensional experiences.79 Significantly, as has happened in the medical
profession, law clinic scholarship and pedagogy have moved away from this
early reliance on tip sheets and pocket guides and now advocate for honing a
set of tools based in self-awareness and reflective practice.s
Both social cognition and culture work have permeated legal scholarship,
particularly over the last few decades. But in law schools, this scholarship only
has a foothold in Law + courses and experiential learning.8 Neither podium8 2
nor Legal Writing courses have widely included an exploration of culture,
context, or cognition in their first-year classrooms.8 3 And while legal clinics
78. Anastasia M. Boles, Seeking Inclusion from the Inside Out: Towards a Paradigm
ofCulturally Proficient Legal Education, 11 CHARLESTON L. REv. 209, 244 (2017); see also
Curcio et al., supra note 6, at 184-89 (chronicling the evolution from cultural competence to
cultural sensibility).
79. See Alfieri, supra note 66, at 837 (arguing that cross-cultural training focused on
acquiring "certain habits of thinking, speaking, and doing understates the deep-seated
dimensions of difference-based identity"); see also Archer, supra note 6 (noting students
who fail to interrogate the post-racial cultural norm that law and culture operate in will fail to
understand how this norm affects lawyering).
80. See generally Chopp, supra note 34, at 371-72 (discussing evolution of cultural
competence training in medical schools); Angela C. Jenks, From 'Lists ofTraits'to 'Open-
Mindedness': Emerging Issues in Cultural Competence Education, 35 CULTURE, MED.,
PSYCHIATRY 209 (2011) (discussing the development of cultural competence training in the
medical profession from an early focus on a categorial approach involving "lists of traits"
and "pocket guides" to a cross-cultural approach that focused on communication and care
across difference).
81. Here, "Law +" denotes courses such as "Feminism and the Law," "Race and the
Law," and "Literature and the Law." See Bannai & Enquist, supra note 67, at 6; Moran,
supra note 5, at 25 (noting "many law schools offer seminars on aspects of gender and race
for interested second and third year law students"); Stanchi, supra note 7, at 611; see also
Mary Lynch, Importance of Experiential Learning for Development of Essential Skills in
Cross-Cultural and Intercultural Effectiveness, 1 J. EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 129, 132-34
(2014).
82. I use "podium" courses to denote traditionally large, lecture-based or Socratic-
method courses that focus on discrete legal topics such as Torts, Property, and Contracts. I
use this term rather than "doctrinal" because both the clinical and legal writing disciplines
have doctrines. Although initially scarce, there are now numerous textbooks for core first-
year courses that present various theoretical critiques and invite students to apply these
approaches to legal issues. See Moran, supra note 5, at 35, 35-36 n.86 (collecting sources).
83. There have been recent efforts by legal writing professors to discuss whether and
how to incorporate concepts like social cognition and bias into the first year legal writing
curriculum. For example, in 2017, the Association of Legal Writing Directors dedicated its
biennial conference to diversity and inclusion, with the theme Acknowledging Lines: Talking
About What Unites Us and Divides Us. See Assoc. OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS, Welcome
to ALWD Conference 2017!, https://perma.cc/U8HL-2RHC. Few legal writing textbooks,
however, explicitly incorporate these topics. In February 2020, Boston University School of
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provide students with invaluable first-hand experiential learning opportunities
through which they can navigate the interplay between law, culture, and the
clients they seek to represent, clinics should not be expected to shoulder this
essential work alone.8 4 In part, the very focus of clinical pedagogy on client-
centered lawyering may not provide sufficient exposure to the constitutive
relationship between law and culture. Additionally, exploring culture merely
through a theoretical lens in practical skills electives may not sufficiently
connect these concepts to actual lawyering practice. Instead of the current
piecemeal, often elective approach, law students should be exposed to
meaningful, sustained, and integrated instruction throughout the law school
curriculum. From influencing how lawyers read, interpret and apply legal rules
to communicating this information to clients, community members, public
representatives, and the legal community, law students should understand that
culture impacts how law is made and how the profession is practiced."
Part II will summarize and critique the ABA's newest accreditation
changes before I move on to outline the tenets of culturally responsive
lawyering.
Law convened a two-day symposium, which acknowledged that "first-year casebooks in
legal education are written from a neutral perspective." Racial Bias, Disparities and
Oppression in the IL Curriculum, B.U. SCHOOL L., https://perma.cc/SE6Z-DNM4. This
symposium brought together faculty and students to explore how to build "an inclusive,
rigorous, and critical first-year legal education that empowers students to be effective legal
professionals." Id.
84. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Back to the Future of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L.
& Soc. JUST. 279, 293 (2012) (noting that "law school clinics have been shouldering the
lion's share of the pedagogical burden for developing in law students the sorely needed
apprenticeships of skills and professional identity."); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note
2, at 577-78 (acknowledging that status and legitimacy issues continue to linger in the law
school faculty hierarchy); Moran, supra note 5, at 19 (noting "one reason why clinical
courses cannot completely bridge the gap between practical and cognitive training is their
placement outside the first-year curriculum"). Although outside the scope of this article, the
new six-credit experiential learning requirement combined with the high cost of providing
in-house clinical courses might lead law schools to expand externship opportunities rather
than their clinical programs. Such a change may jeopardize the inter-cultural sensibility
training that students currently receive in clinical courses.
85. See Bannai & Enquist, supra note 67, at 6 ("As professionals in a multicultural
society, then, today's students are required to become 'culturally competent' .... ."); Curcio,
supra note 49, at 538 ("'[T]hinking like lawyers' requires that they become culturally
sensible lawyers-lawyers who understand that we all have multifaceted cultural
backgrounds, experiences, and biases that affect how we perceive and analyze legal
problems and how we interact with clients and colleagues."); Shiv Narayan Persaud, Is
Color Blind Justice also Culturally Blind: The Cultural Blindness in Justice, 14 BERKELEY J.
AFR. AM. L. & POL'Y 23, 23-24 (2012) ("[C]ompetent representation" and "the fair
dispensation of justice" requires broad-based "cultural competency training among legal
service providers and practitioners."); Bonny L. Tavares, Changing the Construct:
Promoting Cross-Cultural Conversations in the Law School Classroom, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC.
211, 227 (2018) (arguing for "includ[ing] cross-cultural awareness among the many tools
they should use for effective legal analysis.").
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II. FAILING CULTURE IN THE NEW REFORM AGENDA
"[A]ll lawyering is cross-cultural, yetfew lawyers perceive it as such."86
"[W]hat wefail to instill in our law students wefind lacking in our lawyers. "87
Legal education has been in a perennial state of critique and reform for
over a century, yet legal education has remained largely unchanged.
Straddling a "dual identity" of professional school and academic institution,
law schools have attempted to strike the appropriate balance between teaching
what the law is and teaching what to do with the law. 89 In addition to
longstanding critiques about the gap between what law schools teach and what
lawyers need to know, law schools face pressure to adapt to rapidly changing
social, economic, and cultural forces.90 In the midst of these tensions, after
years of study, review, and discussion, in 2014 the ABA Council on Legal
86. Marjorie A Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219, 230 (2002).
87. Wizner, supra note 4, at 708.
88. See Goldfarb, supra note 84, at 290-91. This isn't to say there haven't been any
changes in legal education, or that specific law schools haven't made substantive curricular
change. See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc.
JusT. 247, 263 (2012); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2 (summarizing major changes to legal
education generally and discussing three specific programs). But, as Professor Menkel-
Meadow notes, "[t]he only really big bang has been Langdell's. If one looked at the
schoolroom, the hospital, the police station, the prison, or the business office of the
nineteenth century, and then compared it to today's institutions, one would see more change
in each of these than in the law school classroom." Id. at 579. See also Rakoff & Minow,
supra note 3 (noting the formative first year of law school "remains remarkably similar to
the curriculum invented at the Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus Langdell over
a century and a quarter ago. Invented, that is, not just before the Internet, but before the
telephone .. .; not just before Brown v. Board of Education, but before Plessy v.
Ferguson").
89. See Goldfarb, supra note 84, at 283-84.
90. See id. at 279-80 (noting "changes in social, economic, and cultural forces such as
the internationalization of markets, the incursion of technology, and a series of economic and
global cataclysms occurring since the turn of the millennium" are causing a "seismic shift"
in the legal profession); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Working Notes: Deliberations of the
Committee on Research About the Future of the Legal Profession, On the Current Status of
the Legal Profession Working Notes, 13 ME. B.J. 236, 236 (2001) (noting that the legal
profession is "undergoing unprecedented change"); Chopp, supra note 34, at 365-66, 366 n.7
(stating cultural misunderstandings are more likely to occur as the United States becomes
increasingly more diverse); William D. Henderson, A Blueprintfor Change Symposium: The
Lawyer of the Future, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 461, 470-90 (2013) (discussing changing factors such
as the decline in traditional legal service jobs, the proliferation of legal technology, and the
globalization of legal services); Rosa Kim, Globalizing the Law Curriculum for Twenty-
First-Century Lawyering, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 905, 908 (2018) (arguing that the increase in
cross-border and transnational legal activity requires competencies in navigating multiple
legal systems with diverse stakeholders).
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Education and Admission to the Bar adopted the ABA Revised Standards.
91
Now law schools must design their curricula to ensure that graduates "have
(a) some competencies in delivering (b) some legal services" and not "just
some body of knowledge."92 In addition to requiring two writing experiences
and minimum credit hours for both professionalism and experiential
coursework, law schools must now adopt specific learning outcomes and assess
demonstrated student competencies. 93 Although these newly expanded
requirements seem fairly tame, especially for the institutions tasked with
educating people who will owe ethical and fiduciary duties to others, these
additions actually signal a fundamental change. Previous standards focused
largely on discrete factors unrelated to whether law students could demonstrate
mastery of legal knowledge or skills.
9 4 For example, prior to the adoption of the
revised ABA Standards, the only ABA accreditation requirement arguably
related to student learning was bar passage rates for law school graduates.
95in
contrast, the new standards are meant to close the yawning gap between the
current educational experience provided by law schools and what students
actually need to begin ethical law practice as newly minted lawyers.
Despite these seemingly sweeping changes, it remains unclear what
substantive impact they will have on student learning, especially where social
cognition and culture work are concerned. 96 Although there is growing
91. The ABA Council on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar began a
comprehensive review in 2008 and approved revisions in June 2014. The House of Delegates
concurred in August 2014. See generally Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on the Future ofLegal
Education, Report and Recommendations (Jan. 2014).
92. Id. at 26.
93. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 16. Standard 303(a) states: "A law school shall
offer a curriculum that requires each student to satisfactorily complete at least the following:
(1) one course of at least two credit hours in professional responsibility that includes
substantial instruction in rules of professional conduct, and the values and responsibilities of
the legal profession and its members; (2) one writing experience in the first year and at least
one additional writing experience after the first year, both of which are faculty supervised;
and (3) one or more experiential course(s) totaling at least six credit hours. An experiential
course must be a simulation course, a law clinic, or a field placement." Id.
94. See Niedwiecki, supra note 3, at 671-72, 671-72 nn.65-67 (noting that previously
law schools were evaluated on library size, faculty-student ratio, and the duration of a
student's course of study).
95. Id. at 672-73. As early as 2007, two contemporaneous legal reports specifically
recommended that law schools adopt outcome-based measures that would focus legal
education on the proficiencies that law students would be expected to demonstrate after
completing their legal studies. See generally STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3; SULLVAN ET AL.,
supra note 3.
96. See Boles, supra note 78, at 215-16 (noting that "[u]nlike other professions, the
legal profession has underemphasized the dismantling of social hierarchies through cultural
proficiency efforts."); Lynch, supra note 81, at 132-35 (critiquing the failure of legal
education to incorporate cross-cultural and intercultural learning in the law school
curriculum); Moran, supra note 5, at 33 (acknowledging that "although the legal profession
contributes to developing and maintaining social structures, legal education does not
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acceptance by lawyers and legal scholars of culture's impact on the law, legal
systems, and legal representation, the term "culture" is conspicuously absent
from the Revised Standards' text. Instead, the Managing Director's Guidance
Memo on Standard 302 (Guidance Memo) includes "cultural competence" as
an optional "other professional skill." 9 7 If the goal of legal education is to
ensure law students are prepared to practice law ethically and to advance justice
and equity, then including "cultural competence" as an optional "other skill"
fails to be meaningful reform.
A. ABA Standards 301 and 302
Standards 301 and 302 finally embrace the "knowledge, skills, and values"
paradigm articulated over twenty-five years ago in the ABA Task Force's 1992
MacCrate Report and then echoed fifteen years later by the Clinical Legal
Education Association's report, Best Practices for Legal Education.9 8 To this
end, Standard 301, "Objectives of Program of Legal Education," reiterates that
the traditional goal of a legal education is to prepare graduates for the legal
profession. It states:
(a) A law school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal education that
prepares its students, upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for
effective, ethical, and responsible participation as members of the legal
profession.
(b) A law school shall establish and publish learning outcomes designed to
achieve these objectives.
Standard 302, "Learning Outcomes," sets out minimum competencies for
law school graduates:
A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum,
include competency in the following:
(a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law;
(b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and written
and oral communication in the legal context;
(c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and
the legal system; and
(d) Other professional skills needed for competent and ethical participation as
a member of the legal profession.
recognize cultural competency as a core skill").
97. See A.B.A. Managing Director's Guidance Memo 2 (June 2015) ("A law school
may also identify any additional learning outcomes pertinent to its program of legal
education.") [hereinafter ABA Guidance Memo].
98. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 138-41 (identifying ten "Fundamental
Lawyering Skills" and four "Fundamental Values of the Profession"); see also STUCKEY ET
AL., supra note 3, at 48-67 (identifying core attributes that all law school graduates should be
able to demonstrate prior to admission to the profession include: self-reflection and lifelong
learning skills, intellectual and analytical skills, core knowledge of the law, core
understanding of the law, professional skills, and professionalism).
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According to the ABA Managing Director's Guidance Memo, "[fjocusing
on outcomes should serve as a catalyst for law schools to be intentional in
curriculum development."99 To be sure, the Revised Standards do not jettison
the focus of traditional legal education. As confirmed by the Guidance Memo,
"the traditional legal curriculum, which purports to teach students to 'think like
a lawyer,' will remain at the center of law schools' J.D. programs."
1 00 The
Guidance Memo also makes clear that Standard 302 is not meant to create
uniform legal education across the U.S.' While Standard 302 does require
students to develop knowledge, professional skills, and values through a
structured, coordinated curriculum, it largely leaves the details to each law
school.102
Although embedding flexibility into the Revised Standards allows law
schools to respond to the needs and interests of their students and to adapt as
the legal landscape shifts, it also neglects some of the direct and consistent
critiques of legal education. The MacCrate Report, followed by Best Practices,
called for more than merely refocusing legal education to incorporate lawyering
skills and values. Together, these reports argued that law schools have an
obligation to instill in their students a duty to provide access to justice.'
03 The
99. ABA Guidance Memo, supra note 97, at 3; see also Niedwiecki, supra note 3, at
675 (distinguishing course objectives, where the focus is on what the professor intends to
teach, from learning outcomes, which focus on what a student is able to do upon completion
of the course).
100. ABA Guidance Memo, supra note 97, at 3.
101. See id. at 4 ("Standard 302 outlines the minimum outcomes that a law school must
identify for its program of legal education. Other outcomes will vary depending upon the
stated mission of a law school.").
102. See Andrea A. Curcio, A Simple Low-Cost Institutional Learning-Outcomes
Assessment Process, 67 J. LEGAL EDuc. 489, 492 (2018); Niedwiecki, supra note 3, at 664.
But see Roy Stuckey, The American Bar Association's New Mandates for Teaching
Professional Skills and Values: Impact, Human Resources, New Rolesfor Clinical Teachers,
and Virtual Worlds, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 259, 261 (2016) (noting that "[t]he potential
impact of the ABA mandates is also weakened by the absence of a requirement for law
schools to organize their programs of instruction to help students develop their professional
skills and values in a structured, coordinated curriculum"). On per-school flexibility, see
ABA Guidance Memo, supra note 98, at 6 ("There is no one-size-fits-all set of outcomes or
assessment program."). Standard 314 similarly provides law schools with wide discretion to
establish formative and summative assessment methods to evaluate whether students are
attaining the competency levels set forth by each law school. ABA STANDARDS, supra note
24, at 23 (Standard 314). ABA Standard 315, Interpretation 315-1 states "The methods used
to measure the degree of student achievement of learning outcomes are likely to differ from
school to school and law schools are not required by this standard to use any particular
methods." Id. at 24.
103. See STUcKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 19 (calling on law schools to "give more
attention to educating students about the importance of providing access to justice and to
instilling a commitment to provide access to justice in their students"); MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 140-41 (describing four "fundamental values of the profession:" as 1)
provision of competent representation; 2) striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality;
3) striving to improve the profession; and 4) professional self-development); see also Moran,
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MacCrate Report emphasized that "competent, ethical practice" requires that
students possess "more than just knowledge of the applicable rules and
principles of professional responsibility." 104 It specifically called on law
schools to teach students about their duty to "promote justice, fairness, and
morality" in their daily practice, to refrain from any type of discrimination, and
to improve both the legal system and the profession.1 0 5 Such improvement
included "rationalizing the law and legal institutions" and taking corrective
measures to address the legal system's deficiencies. 106 Teaching justice,
promoting equity, and improving the legal profession and the judicial system
require a deep and nuanced understanding of the relationship between law and
culture. The Revised Standards, however, do not fully incorporate this charge
and actually suggest in their framing that law students may be able to graduate
without ever exploring how culture impacts the law or their role as lawyers.10 7
As a result, these current reforms also fail to keep pace with the accrediting
standards of other client-facing professional schools. A quick survey of
accrediting requirements for medical,o nursing,1 09 social work, 110 and dental
schools"' reveals that each of their accrediting bodies has some formal
educational requirement tied to cultural competency. For example, since 2000,
the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME), the accrediting body
for medical education in the U.S. and Canada, has included specific standards
supra note 5, at 23 (noting the reports are "clear on the lawyer's obligation to promote, and
the law school's obligation to teach, justice").
104. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 207.
105. Id. at 207-21 (describing four fundamental values of the profession).
106. Id at 215. Quoting from the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
MacCrate Report states that "corrective measures" include "endeavoring to change '[r]ules
of law ... [that] are not just, understandable, and responsive to the needs of society." Id.
107. Moran, supra note 5, at 23. ("[I]n the twenty-first century law school, students can
(and often do) graduate without any exposure to questions of gender, race, ethnicity, or
class.").
108. See Chopp, supra note 34, at 384-86 (discussing cultural competence standards
and training in medical schools); Functions and Structure of a Medical School: Standards
for Accreditation of Medical Education Programs Leading to the MD Degree, LIAISON
COMMITIEE ON MEDICAL EDUCATION 11, 22 (2016), https://perma.cc/U34B-R5VS; ACGME
Common Program Requirements (Residency), ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE
MEDICAL EDUCATION 19, 21 (2018), https://perma.cc/YYR4-N2VT.
109. See generally Suzan Kardong-Edgren & Josepha Campinha-Bacote, Cultural
Competency of Graduating US Bachelor of Science Nursing Students, 28 NAT'L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. 37 (2008).
110. See Chopp, supra note 34, at 390 (summarizing social work accreditation
standards and competencies related to cultural competence); Educational Policy and
Accreditation Standards for Baccalaureate and Master's Social Work Programs, COUNCIL
ON SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION 1, 7, 14 (2015), https://perma.cc/9A8R-QB9U.
111. See Accreditation Standards for Dental Education Programs, COMMISSION ON
DENTAL ACCREDITATION, ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR DENTAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS
1, 16-17,27,31 (2016), https://perma.cc/XL9U-PWGH.
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for cultural competence. 112 LCME Standard 7.6 requires that "faculty and
students must demonstrate an understanding of the manner in which people of
diverse cultures and belief systems perceive health and illness and respond to
various symptoms, diseases, and treatments."13 It also calls for "medical
students to learn to recognize and appropriately address gender and cultural
biases in themselves, in others, and in the health care delivery process."
1 1 4
Similarly, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) has established
nine competencies that a social work student should be able to demonstrate
upon graduation. 115 These competencies describe "the knowledge, values,
skills, cognitive and affective processes, and behaviors associated with
competence at the generalist level of practice."
1 1 6 Competency 2, "Engage
Diversity and Difference in Practice," states:
Social workers understand how diversity and difference characterize and
shape the human experience and are critical to the formation of identity ....
Social workers understand that, as a consequence of difference, a person's life
experiences may include oppression, poverty, marginalization, and alienation
as well as privilege, power, and acclaim. Social workers also understand the
forms and mechanisms of oppression and discrimination and recognize the
extent to which a culture's structures and values, including social, economic,
political, and cultural exclusions, may oppress, marginalize, alienate, or create
privilege and power."7
According to the CSWE, to demonstrate this competency social workers
should be able to:
apply and communicate understanding of the importance of diversity and
difference in shaping life experiences in practice at the micro, mezzo, and
112 . See Cultural Competence Education for Medical Students, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGES (2005), https://perma.cc/T93N-CYRB; see generally
Functions and Structure of a Medical School: Standards for Accreditation of Medical
Education Programs Leading to the MD Degree, LIAISON COMMITrEE ON MEDICAL
EDUCATION (Mar. 2016).
113. See Functions and Structure of a Medical School, supra note 112, at 11.
Additionally, Standard 7.6 requires that the medical curriculum include instruction in "[t]he
basic principles of culturally competent health care. The recognition and development of
solutions for health care disparities. The importance of meeting the health care needs of
medically underserved populations. The development of core professional attributes (e.g.,
altruism, accountability) needed to provide effective care in a multidimensional and diverse
society." Id.
114. Id at 11. Supporting these curriculum requirements, The American Association of
Medical Colleges also developed the Tool for Assessing Cultural Competence Training
(TACCT), which medical schools can use to assess whether students are developing cross-
cultural sensibilities. See Chopp, supra note 34, at 385; see also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
MEDICAL COLLEGES, supra note 114, at 4-6. The Code of Medical Ethics further reinforces
the import of culture and working to counteract both explicit and implicit bias. See Chopp,
supra note 34, at 393-94.
115. See Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards, supra note 110, at 1, 7-9.
116. Id. at 11 (Educational Policy 2.0-Generalist Practice).
117. Id. at 7 (Competency 2: Engage Diversity and Difference in Practice).
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macro levels; present themselves as learners and engage clients and
constituencies as experts of their own experiences; and apply self-awareness
and self-regulation to manage the influence of personal biases and values in
working with diverse clients and constituencies."'
Even the National Architecture Accreditation Board requires accredited
degree programs to demonstrate that graduates possess knowledge and skills
relating to how culture impacts their profession.119 Under competencies for
"critical thinking and representation," graduates of accredited architecture
programs should be able to demonstrate the following understanding:
A.7 History and Global Culture: Understanding of the parallel and divergent
histories of architecture and the cultural norms of a variety of indigenous,
vernacular, local, and regional settings in terms of their political, economic,
social, ecological, and technological factors.
A.8 Cultural Diversity and Social Equity: Understanding of the diverse needs,
values, behavioral norms, physical abilities, and social and spatial patterns that
characterize different cultures and individuals and the responsibility of the
architect to ensure equity of access to sites, buildings, and structures.12 0
Each of those professional standards and competencies require schools to
demonstrate that graduates understand how culture and context affect clients
and the professional/client relationship. They even go further to require that
students recognize and address systemic and structural inequity.
In contrast, the ABA Revised Standards do not explicitly require that law
students be able to demonstrate how culture and context impact clients and the
professional/client relationship. Nor do they require law students to question,
challenge, or remedy the American legal system's biased foundations.2 1 Such
competencies, however, are essential to legal education and to ethical law
practice.122 Neglecting to require them is particularly problematic because law,
like medicine and social work, is historically and culturally situated.
118. Id In addition to these accreditation competencies, the National Association of
Social Workers (NASW) adopted Standards for Cultural Competence in Social Work
Practice and Indicators for the Achievement of the NASW Standards for Cultural
Competence in Social Work Practice. The social work code of ethics also charges social
workers with the ethical responsibility to be culturally competent. See CODE OF ETHICS,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORK, Standard 1.05, at 4 (Cultural Awareness and
Social Diversity) https://perma.cc/CMR9-FHGB.
119. NAT'L ARCHITECTURAL ACCREDITING BD., INC., 2014 Conditions for Accreditation
15-16 (2015), https://perma.cc/24DZ-YJT8.
120. Id
121. Boles,supra note 78, at221-22.
122. See Nora Freeman Engstrom et al., Dear SLS Students, We Can Do Better, STAN.
DAILY (Feb. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/4ASA-F6MY; see also supra note 74 (listing a
number of clinical professors who argue that cultural competency is a fundamental skill).
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B. The Problem with 302(d): Cultural Competence as an "Other" Professional
Skill
Unlike the changes made by accrediting bodies for other professions, the
ABA has neglected to account for the way that culture and social cognition
impact the study and practice of law. Excluding "culture" from the Revised
Standards and then including "cultural competence" as an optional "other skill"
in the Interpretation to Standard 302 poses numerous problems. Interpretation
302-1 states:
For the purposes of Standard 302(d), other professional skills are determined
by the law school and may include skills such as, interviewing, counseling,
negotiation, fact development and analysis, trial practice, document drafting,
conflict resolution, organization and management of legal work, collaboration,
cultural competency, and self-evaluation.'2
3
First, by being optional, the Guidance Memo suggests that "cultural
competence" is not required for competent lawyering. Even though the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility do not specifically address an
attorney's duty to consider social cognition or to engage in culturally
competent practice,124 lawyers, scholars, and even ABA Section groups have
been calling for such an interpretation for at least a decade.
125 The preamble to
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility specifically calls on lawyers to
"seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession." 126
Paragraph 6 goes on to say:
123. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 16 (emphasis added).
124. See Chopp, supra note 34, at 395-96 (noting that MRPR 2.1 "is th[e] rule that
comes closest to acknowledging a client's embeddedness in his/her own culture, but does not
explicitly acknowledge it"). In August 2016 the ABA House of Delegates adopted changes
proposed by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Id. at
398. The Model Rules now include a prohibition on knowingly or negligently engaging in
conduct that "is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law." Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). As Chopp notes, revised Rule 8.4 represents an
improvement, but it fails to acknowledge in the text or the Comments that unconscious bias
plays a significant role in everyday professional interactions. Chopp, supra note 34, at 398.
125. See, e.g., Sylvia E. Stevens, Is There an Ethical Duty?: Cultural Competency, 69
OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 9-10 (2009) (arguing that Oregon RPC 1.1 should be read to include
cultural competence); Chopp, supra note 34, at 390, 396 (stating "[i]t is clear from the rule
and from the cases that have interpreted the rule that 'competence' does not include cultural
or linguistic competence, nor does it include competence to recognize and address biases"
and arguing for the inclusion of additional guidance in the Comment to MRPR 1.1); Aastha
Madaan, Cultural Competency and the Practice of Law in the 21st Century, PROB. & PROP.
MAG. (2018) 1-3, https://perma.cc/H54Z-E26J; BLANCA BANUELOS ET AL., EMBRACING
DIVERSITY AND BEING CULTURALLY COMPETENT is No LONGER OPTIONAL 5-6 (2012),
https://perma.cc/MM5D-Y5SQ.
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF. RESP. Preamble (AM. BAR A 'N 2016) section 6.
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As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of
the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law
and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further
the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice
system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on
popular participation and support to maintain their authority."2 7
In addition to the Preamble, MRPR 1.1 (Competence), 128 MRPR 1.3
(Diligence), 129 and MRPR 1.4 (Communication) 130 require attorneys to
consider cultural context and social cognition in the provision of legal
services.131 Such a reading of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
127. Id.
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF. REsP. r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). The language in
MRPR 1.1 specifically acknowledges that a lawyer owes a duty of competent representation
to her client, and that this requires "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." Neither the rule nor the commentary includes
any reference to culture. The most recent addition to the Commentary added a requirement
that lawyers keep abreast of relevant technology, but it fails to require that lawyers consider
developments in other fields, like cognitive and medical sciences, which may impact an
attorney's ability to provide counsel. Id. But, as Andrea Curcio notes, "[i]n today's multi-
cultural world, regardless of practice area, lawyers cannot accurately analyse a case without
understanding the context, and they cannot understand the context if they are unaware of the
cultural forces that may be in play." Andrea Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible
Lawyers: A Study of Student Attitudes About the Role Culture Plays in the Lawyering
Process, 16 U. W. SYDNEY L. REV. 98, 103 (2012).
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF. RESP. r. 1.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). MRPR 1.3 states that
"[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Id.
Comment 1 to MRPR 1.3 explains in part that "[a] lawyer must [I] act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf"
MODEL RULES OF PROF. RESP. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF. RESP. r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016). MRPR 1.4 regulates
when a lawyer must communicate with a client. As Professor Debra Chopp notes, the rule
and the comments to it "are centered on the lawyer's perspective-they dictate when a
lawyer must provide details about trial strategy or proposals made during negotiation. They
address client comprehension only in the situation of a client who is a minor or has a
disability." Chopp, supra note 34, at 393. She argues that failing to account for the client
perspective and how culture impacts trust building and communication is a "significant
defect." Id. at 394. See also Curcio et al., supra note 128, at 102 ("Because culture affects
verbal and non-verbal communication ... lack of cultural sensibility skills make it more
difficult for lawyers to effectively interview, counsel, negotiate, strategise, or resolve
conflicts."); Nelson P. Miller et al., Equality as Talisman: Getting Beyond Bias to Cultural
Competence as a Professional Skill, 25 T. M. COOLEY L. REv. 99, 115 (2008) (discussing
"communication" as one of five main categories for cultural competency).
131. See BANUELOS ET AL., supra note 125, at 5-6; Hamilton & Maleska, supra note
33, at 189 ("For a lawyer to truly provide competent representation to his or her clients, the
lawyer must not only understand the law, but also understand the culture of: (1) the client;
(2) the groups with whom the lawyer works to advance the client's interests; and (3) the
adversaries and decision-makers whom the lawyer seeks to influence."); see also Moran,
supra note 6, at 26-31 (describing the MacCrate Report and Educating Lawyers and their
call for law schools to include values education and the eradication of bias as part of ethical
training).
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makes culture's absence from the ABA's Revised Standards (and many law
school classrooms) that much more stark.
And, if legal education's past reform pace is prologue, law schools will
make the fewest changes possible to comply with the new accreditation
standards. This trend is already apparent. While some law schools have adopted
cultural competence as a learning outcome, many have adopted learning
outcomes that do not explicitly require consideration of culture or any facility
with intercultural law practice. The Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in
the Professions has compiled a database of learning outcomes published by law
schools. 132 As of its last update in June 2019, the Holloran Center had analyzed
the learning outcomes from 177 law schools. Of these, it identified only 46 law
schools that had included some form of cultural competency as a learning
outcome. 133 Even within those listed under "Cultural Competence," the
learning outcomes vary wildly. For example, Penn State Dickinson requires
under "Professional Values" that each graduating student will understand "the
important role that cultural competency serves in a lawyer's ability to deliver
competent legal services to clients."
134 The University of Washington School of
Law expects law graduates to work collaboratively with others, which includes
"[u]nderstand[ing] and appreciat[ing] the diverse backgrounds and perspectives
of clients, colleagues, adversaries, and others."35 University of Minnesota
132. See, e.g., Holloran Center Learning Outcomes Database, U. ST. THOMAS,
https://perma.cc/P6LY-RUSN (cataloging law schools' published learning outcomes and
identifying those that have identified cultural competence).
133. While useful for thinking about how law schools are fulfilling the ABA
requirement to adopt and publish learning outcomes, the Holloran Center website does not
contain clear guidance on the criteria used for the identifying whether a learning outcome
should be placed in the sub-category for "Cultural Competence." See id. For example, both
Northeastern University School Law (NUSL) and Stanford Law School are not included in
the "Cultural Competence" database, but both schools specifically include "culture" in their
learning outcomes. For example NUSL's commitment to the ideals of culturally responsive
lawyering is evident from both its published core values, which acknowledge that "social
and cultural awareness [] are essential to serving clients and pursuing social justice" and
from its learning outcomes that require students to "understand law in its social context."
History and Mission, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, https://perma.cc/EKT8-EBT9.
Stanford Law School includes "cultural competency" in its Learning Outcome 7 as "other
professional skills." In addition, while not specifically mentioning "culture," Learning
Outcome 2 requires that students "Demonstrate facility with legal analysis and reasoning.
This may include, but will not necessarily include, a combination of skills such as
synthesizing cases, identifying and applying relevant principles, and mastering modes of
inquiry (whether scientific, social scientific, or humanistic) that inform and contextualize
legal analysis and reasoning." Student Handbook 2018-2019, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL,
https://perma.cc/HP2P-7J7E.
134. Learning Outcomes, PENN STATE DIcKINSON LAW, https://perma.cc/8ZGE-AVB3.
135 . Student Learning Outcomes, UNIV. OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF LAW,
https://perma.cc/Z337-GGC7. Although not identified by the Holloran Center as a "Cultural
Competence" learning outcome, arguably all of Learning Outcome 6 could fit under this
umbrella. That learning outcome states that law graduates of the University of Washington
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School of Law expects their graduates to be able to "(4) collaborate, including
the ability to ... (ii) Respect diverse views and perspectives and work
effectively across difference."1 36
In part, this variety may be a result of the Revised Standards' requirement
that law schools not only identify learning outcomes, but that they also assess
whether their students are meeting the standards. Faculties and Learning
Outcomes Committee members struggle to find consensus on competencies
like "legal analysis" that have been core to legal education for over a hundred
years. "Cultural competence" is perhaps even more difficult.1 37 As a concept,
"cultural competence" has been described as "amorphous," "nebulous," and
even "tautolog[ical]."l3 The term "competence" as it relates to "culture" has
additional issues. In learning theory, "competence" illustrates a process of
mastery.139 And while some scholars have mapped the development of self-
reflection and cross-cultural intrapersonal skills onto the stages of
competence, 140 culture" cannot be mastered. Where culture is concerned,
seeking mastery is particularly dangerous because such an approach has often
led to acquiring knowledge of the "other" and prioritizing specific performative
dos and don'ts.
Second, in a framework setting out three competence spheres (knowledge,
skills, and values), identifying "cultural competence" as an "other professional
skill" ignores the complex relationship between culture, law, and competent
lawyering. It suggests, among other things, that law and its participants operate
outside of "culture." 141 For example, law schools could identify "cultural
School of law should be able to: "Situate issues in their extra-legal context. This includes the
ability to: 1) Understand the law from diverse and global perspectives; 2) Recognize the
political, social, and economic forces that shape various areas of the law; and 3) Consider
not only the likelihood of an argument or strategy's legal success, but also the moral,
economic, social, political, and other factors implicated by the argument or strategy."
136. Learning Outcomes for the JD Program, UNIV. OF MNNESOTA LAW SCHOOL,
https://perma.cc/P3HM-XMV2.
137. See Lynch, supra note 81, at 134 (noting that "law schools have not yet addressed
intercultural learning in systematic ways nor prioritized its importance in pre-professional
legal education").
138. Casey Schutte, Mandating Cultural Competence Training for Dependency
Attorneys, 52 FAM. CT. REv. 564, 567 (2014).
139. Curcio et al., supra note 128, at 100.
140. See Boles, supra note 78, at 248-57 (discussing the cultural continuum utilized by
Dr. Kikanza Nuri-Robins). Additionally, a number of assessments have been developed for
industry and educational use. For example, the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI) is
a 50-item questionnaire that "assesses intercultural competence-the capability to shift
cultural perspective and appropriately adapt behavior to cultural differences and
commonalities." See IDI, The Roadmap to Intercultural Competence Using the IDI,
https://perma.cc/SUJ9-UPJF.
141. See Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice Papers Presented at the Rutgers-
Newark Law School Conference on the Social Justice Mission of Clinical Education, 7 CLIN.
L. REv. 287, 290 (2001) ("The law does not exist 'out there' to be found; rather it is a
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competence" but treat it as a performative skill, confining it to courses
specifically designated as "skills" or "experiential." 1
42 Even if exposed to
"cultural competence" in a law school clinic or other "skills" course, law
students may only see "culture" as related to individualized client
representation. Such a perspective risks limiting law students' understanding of
the ways that culture infiltrates and creates human interaction and
understanding and the impact it has on law, legal decision makers, and legal
institutions. It also reifies a false theory/practice divide.
143 This divide belies
what any practicing attorney knows: competent lawyering requires a holistic
approach in which these spheres intermingle and reinforce one another.
Additionally, many law school courses that focus on the "skills" and "values"
spheres-like Legal Writing and in-house legal clinics-are taught by faculty
with less status, rights, and remuneration than those who teach courses focused
primarily on the "knowledge" sphere.1
44 Such hierarchies impede the type of
imagination and collaboration necessary for durable, institution-wide reform.
Finally, to thrive in practice, law students' socialization to the legal
profession should enhance, not undermine, their ability to understand how
culture impacts the law and the lawyering process.'
45 But current legal training,
particularly in the critical first-year curriculum, does not prepare future lawyers
to understand or mitigate the effects of implicit social cognition and other
cognitive processes on legal analysis, decision-making, and client
representation.146 Nor does it prepare law students to navigate the myriad ways
that culture affects lawyering. If it did, then law schools could continue to
reflection of a complex interplay of information, experience, and value choice.").
142. Moran, supra note 5, at 19-20.
143. See generally Harold Anthony Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising
Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal Theory, Practice, and the Humanities, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1213 (2014) (criticizing the existence of a theory/practice divide in legal
education as impossible factually and semantically); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in
Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education Symposium: Clinical Education, 34
UCLA L. REv. 577, 577 (1986) (critiquing the division of traditional legal education "into
the theoretical and the practical: the main tent and the sideshow"); Goldfarb, supra note 85,
at 285-86 (explaining "[a]nalysis, synthesis, reasoning, and application to new situations of
the legal doctrine that emerges from judicial opinions are fundamental lawyering skills,
which are at once both intellectual and practical endeavors."); Lynch, supra note 81, at 988
(arguing "[t]he claim of a dichotomy, that 'theory' is somehow in opposition to, or unrelated
to, 'practice,' should no longer have a place in serious discussion of legal education."); see
also Curcio et al., supra note 6, at 193-94 (noting that the knowledge-attitudes-skills
framework is used by many disciplines to develop student learning outcomes but there is
invariably overlap in these spheres).
144. See Lynch, supra note 81, at 988.
145. Miller et al., supra note 130, at 112-13 (arguing cultural competencies can, and
should be, taught by integrating "cultural-competency work" into the law school
curriculum).
146. Curcio, supra note 48, at 552 (noting that "[]egal training in rational and
analytical thinking does not immunize one from having and acting upon biases").
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replicate their current curricula with the confidence that newly-minted lawyers
could operate bias-free, or minimally bias-aware, and culturally proficient.
A recent survey of law students by Andrea A. Curcio, Teresa E. Ward &
Nisha Dogra, however, demonstrates the opposite. 147 In general, the law
students surveyed minimized the impact of culturally biased assumptions on
their decision-making and believed they possessed a strong ability to identify
when bias affected their behavior or judgment. 148 For example, students
thought a client would be more influenced by cultural background than a
lawyer would.149 According to their analysis, "Students felt fairly confident that
they could identify when they were acting based upon stereotypes or culturally
biased assumptions."1s 0 The results suggested that law students may actually
think that "legal training somehow immunizes lawyers from viewing legal
problems and clients through their own cultural lenses, and from having
cultural biases that affect their analyses and interactions."5 1
This mismatch between what students believe and what scholars (and many
practitioners) know has been exacerbated by the failure of law schools to adopt
curriculum-wide reforms. Even though law schools remain responsible for
training future lawyers, they have consistently failed to provide students with
sufficient direct instruction and experiential learning opportunities that might
address such concerns. As explained above, modern scholarship in legal theory
and social cognition suggests that law students will be hard-pressed to
demonstrate the competencies required by Standard 302 without sustained
instruction and opportunities to explore and reflect on how culture influences
law and its practice.152 Without this foundation, practicing lawyers may fall
short of their ethical duties to their clients and to the profession.3
As a result, even when law schools do not specifically identify cultural
competence as an "other professional skill" under Standard 302(d), they should
nonetheless view culturally responsive lawyering as essential to fulfilling the
requirements of Standards 301 and 302. That is because law schools provide a
powerful unifying experience for future lawyers as they become acculturated to
the profession. 154 Law schools teach the "craft of law" and "inculcate[]
147. See id. at 541-43; see also Curcio et al., supra note 7.
148. Curcio, supra note 48, at 543-44.
149. Id. at 542-43 ("589 law student respondents thought lawyers are less likely than
clients, and somewhat less likely thanjudges, to look at legal problems through their own
cultural lens. Students were even less likely to think that they, personally, viewed the legal
system through a culturally biased lens").
150. Id. at 544.
151. Id. at 540.
152. See Bryant, supra note 73, at 53-54; Piomelli, supra note 30, at 162 (arguing that
we must "direct[] attention to what we know about others [and ourselves], how we feel about
them [and ourselves], and how we act on our knowledge and feelings").
153. Persaud, supra note 85, at 24.
154. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-6. The Educating Lawyers report
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professional values, explicitly or implicitly.""' Although inserting the term
"ethical" into Standard 301(a) is a small addition compared to the new learning
outcomes requirements announced in 301(b) and further outlined in Standard
302, this addition provides support for adopting culturally responsive lawyering
as an orienting framework for curricular reform. In combination with the
language in Standards 301(b) and 302(c), the new objectives signal that all law
schools should teach and provide opportunities for students to demonstrate
ethical lawyering 156 Explicitly interweaving culture work throughout the
curriculum and specifically embedding learning outcomes within each sphere-
knowledge, skills, and values-will help to ensure that all graduates can
demonstrate how social cognition, culture, and context impact law and can
provide culturally sensible legal services once in practice.
III. TEACHING CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE LAWYERING
"[Liaw is the quintessentialform of 'active'discourse, able by its own
operation to produce effects. It would not be excessive to say that it
creates the social world, but only zfwe remember that it is this world
whichfirst creates law."m5
Culturally responsive lawyering rejects the notion that "cultural
competence" is an optional skill, divorced from other core competencies.
Rather, culturally responsive lawyering is grounded in a deliberative process
that extends deeper than outward-facing performative skills and embraces what
scholars and lawyers already know: culture matters. There are three core tenets
of culturally responsive lawyering. These tenets specifically build on two
pillars: scholarship that grapples with the relationship between law and culture,
and clinical pedagogy that seeks to build inclusive lawyering models and teach
observed that the first months of law school provide "rapid socialization into the standards of
legal thinking" (Observation 1), that this socialization occurs mostly through the case
method, which provides students with a "deep, largely uncritical level" of understanding
(Observation 2); and "the task of connecting [abstracted legal] conclusions with the rich
complexity of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people, let along the job of
thinking through social consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains outside
the case-dialogue methods." See also Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law:
From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1, 61 (1995) (arguing that
"casebooks have the power to influence students' and readers' views beyond the closed
confines ofclassroom black-letter law").
155. Wizner, supra note 4, at 591; see also Moran, supra note 5, at 29 ("Legal
education's null curriculum works against producing well trained lawyers by letting students
believe that gender, race, ethnicity, and class are not important to their future practice."); see
also Lynch, supra note 81 (discussing the 2007 Educating Lawyers report, which described
legal education as an acculturation process).
156. See ABA Guidance Memo, supra note 97, at 1-4.
157. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force ofLaw: Toward a Sociology ofthe Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 839 (1987).
2332020]1
234 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CVIL RIGHTS& CIVIL LIBERTIES [XVI:201
those models to students as they learn to be lawyers.
Culturally responsive lawyering:
(1) Accepts that culture and law exist in a mutually constitutive
relationship;
(2) Uses transformative legal analysis, a transparent and integrated
approach to legal problem-solving that evaluates the impact of culture,
context, and cognition on what the law is and makes normative
assertions about what the law should be; and
(3) Employs transformative legal analysis along with inter-cultural
sensibility in the provision of legal services or when otherwise
operating within the legal profession.
Embedding the tenets of culturally responsive lawyering from the very first
day of law school will demonstrate to students that understanding culture is
essential in the legal profession. 158 While these tenets should be adopted
institution-wide and appear in every law school course regardless of size or
content area, minimally they should be incorporated throughout the first-year
curriculum and in the courses that meet the ABA-required Legal Writing,
professional responsibility, and experiential learning credits.159
In the first year, other than the ABA's requirement that law schools
provide their students with "a rigorous writing experience,"'60 law schools have
autonomy to design their course curricula. In addition to Legal Research and
Writing, which introduces students to legal discourse and the structure and
function of the legal system, and requires them to apply substantive and
procedural law through a series of written and oral assignments,161 most law
schools require first-year students to take Torts, Civil Procedure, Property,
Contracts, Criminal Law, and Constitutional Law. While critiques of this
formula abound, 162 the proposal here does not ask law schools or law
professors to abandon this framework. Rather, it asks them to adopt an
approach to teaching these courses that develops competencies in culturally
158. See Moran, supra note 5, at 19 ("[T]he first year of law school is the time when
students learn what 'really counts' in their profession.").
159. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 16.
160. Kenneth D. Chestek, MacCrate (in)Action: The Case for Enhancing the Upper-
Level Writing Requirement in Law Schools, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 115, 122 (2007).
161. See Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the
Delegalization ofLaw, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 909, 913 (2011) (noting legal research and
writing instruction in the. first year focuses on "traditional legal authority-statues, cases,
regulations, treatises, law review articles, and legislative history").
162. See, e.g., Rakoff & Minow, supra note 2 (arguing for problem-solving, fact-




Blending the three tenets of culturally responsive lawyering, learning
outcomes that could be adopted in any law course might include the following:
(1) Students will be able to identify the mutually constitutive relationship
among law, legal actors, and the people and relationships law
regulates;
(2) Students will be able to identify, analyze, and work within the cultural
contexts in which legal problems emerge;
(3) Students will be able to identify how social cognition impacts law,
legal systems, and the provision of legal services;
(4) Students will be able to understand how their own identities and
cultures interact and interface with legal analysis, decision-making,
and communication;
(5) Students will be able to identify and use narrative structures in various
forms of legal communication with their clients and other members of
the legal profession;
(6) Students will be able to identify, understand, evaluate, and employ
various types of authority in context;
(7) Students will be able to identify structural barriers to the equitable
provision of legal services.
When students can demonstrate competence in the learning outcomes
above, they will be able to integrate transformative legal analysis into the
provision of culturally sensible legal services-both in their experiential
courses and later in practice. These learning outcomes satisfy the minimum
competencies set out in Standard 302. Specifically, the components of
transformative legal analysis, discussed in Subpart B below, meet Standards
302(a) and 302(b) by requiring students to demonstrate an understanding of and
facility with law as process and product, historically grounded and culturally
informed. Additionally, the components of intercultural sensibility, discussed in
Subpart C below, satisfy Standard 302(c) and (d), which require students to
demonstrate the skills and values required to exercise their ethical
responsibilities to clients and the legal profession.
Interweaving the tenets of culturally responsive lawyering throughout the
law school curriculum will help students become ethical, effective lawyers. The
Subparts below provide a conceptual sketch of culturally responsive
lawyering's three tenets and some suggestions for how to include them in any
law school course.
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A. Acknowledging That Culture and Law Exist in a Mutually Constitutive
Relationship
Although few mandatory law school courses explicitly teach about the
relationship between law and culture, the concept is not novel. As discussed in
Part I.B, which summarized scholarship from the fields of critical theory,
rhetoric, and clinical pedagogy, law is created and implemented in culturally
specific contexts.163 Similar to the function of language as a symbolic system,
law's "intended and unintended meanings circulate and are transformed. Those
whom the law seeks to govern may redefine the law, the law may redefine
them, or both."14 This is to say: culture impacts law and legal structures as
well as the relationships that law often regulates, informs, and defines. For
example, as Eduardo Capulong notes, in the pages of legal decisions humans
are legal categories: "human identity and circumstances are defined by legal
doctrine and formal legal institutions." 6 5 Culture impacts these categories by
affecting social and political norms.166 At the same time, law feeds back into
this loop by "shap[ing] individual and group identity, social practices as well as
the meaning of cultural symbols." 16 When viewed within a constitutive
framework, legal terms and concepts-whether "marriage," "reasonable
person," or "dwelling house"-are historically and culturally grounded and
have both descriptive and generative functions.
What does this mean for legal education? Inquiry into law and culture
should not remain neatly bound in scholarly journals or cabined to discussions
at academic conferences.168 From the first day of their first class, law students
should be taught to engage in critical thinking about the law. As they pore over
casebooks and pick apart statutes, they should be taught to deconstruct and
reconstruct meaning from various perspectives, situating culture and context at
163. See Mezey, supra note 29, at 60 (noting that implementing law "always takes
place in culturally specific contexts"); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect"
from Racial Profiling to Depolicing: Toward a Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIvIL
RIGHTS RESEARCH: A CONSTITUTIvE APPROACH 23 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth
Nielsen eds., 2006), https://perma.cc/L3K4-KMSK ("Law is a set of discourses that hold
sway over our very ways of seeing the world"); see also Carolyn Grose, A Persistent
Critique: Constructing Clients'Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 329, 329 (2006) (suggesting the
dominant discourse around gender impacts which stories law understands); Aiken, supra
note 141, at 290 ("The law does not exist 'out there' to be found; rather it is a reflection of
the complex interplay of information, experience, and value choice.").
164. Mezey, supra note 29, at 60.
165. Capulong, supra note 23, at 39; see also Chase, supra note 154.
166. Mezey, supra note 29, at 46 (noting that culture impacts "what is socially
desirable, politically feasible, [and] legally legitimate").
167. Id.
168. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 573 (noting, for example, the law and
literature movement has produced substantial scholarship but that "the core of legal
education has hardly been touched by these developments, except for a more informed set of
interpretive moves and principles in the legal interpretation").
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the heart of this inquiry. Although particular professors may expose their law
students to the widely accepted theory that "all interpretations of law are
cultural interpretations,"l69 too often the way in which law and legal analysis
are taught (and even practiced)-as objective and neutral-masks this
reality.170
Returning to this article's opening scene, the concurring decision denying
Mr. Demesme's writ confirms that cultural ignorance has the potential to harm
individuals, create bad law, and undermine the legal system.1
71 If we accept
that law and culture constitute one another, then understanding the constitutive
relationship is essential to competent lawyering. Adopting transformative legal
analysis, a more transparent and integrated approach that illuminates the
complex relationship between law and culture, will ground student learning and
help them to develop critical cognitive architecture for interpreting and
practicing law.
B. Using Transformative Legal Analysis
Transformative legal analysis incorporates concepts from discourse
analysis, cultural studies, and critical legal theory to evaluate the impact of
culture, context, and cognition on what the law is and to make normative
assertions about what the law should be.172 These theoretical underpinnings
provide rich dimensionality and perspective to the study and practice of law. In
particular, transformative legal analysis borrows and expands upon Professor
Naomi Mezey's cultural interpretation of law framework, which sets out three
spheres of inquiry: (1) the site of production; (2) the cultural practices that
"inspire the law and those that the law confronts when applied"; and (3) the
"encounter between law and culture." 1 7
3 While course content will certainly
vary, before graduation students should become comfortable identifying and
interrogating two spheres: law's sources and the socio-cultural contexts in
169. Mezey, supra note 29, at 58.
170. See Moran, supra note 5, at 15 ("[T]he case method, which is generally accepted
as the central defining feature of the last one hundred years of legal education, tends to
maintain, and even reinforce, class gender, and race hierarchies."); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 987, 1033 (2012)
(noting "rules derive meaning only in use. To talk of the meaning of rules, however, is
senseless without focusing on whose meaning and in what use").
171. See generally Hebert, supra note 15.
172. The argument for teaching legal theory-particularly critical legal theory-is not
new. In fact, in a 1998 article Professor Kathryn Stanchi advocated for incorporating critical
theory and methodology in first year courses. See generally Stanchi, supra note 66. But, as
she noted a decade later, podium courses largely taught using the case method remain
paramount, while both skills and theory are marginalized. See Stanchi, supra note 6, at 611.
173. Mezey, supra note 29, at 63.
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which law operates.'74
The Subparts below include suggestions for teaching transformative legal
analysis through exploring these two spheres.
1. Investigating law's sources
Exploring law and its sources is the bread and butter of law school
curricula. This sphere of inquiry includes traditional sites of legal meaning such
as the text of federal and state constitutions, judicial opinions interpreting
statutory or common law rules, legislative history, and scholarly commentary.
Like Professor Mezey's framework, transformative legal analysis also
incorporates learning about these sources of authority and the relationship they
have to one another.'7 5 It asks students to complexify their understanding of the
law and legal system by understanding these sources as part of a larger cultural
project in which they operate .17 6 To do this, in each first-year course, students
should be instructed how to situate legal sources in context. As Professor Amy
Griffin explains, "[t]he landscape of legal authority is not fixed and flat."' 7 7
Recognizing such dynamic terrain, transformative legal analysis requires the
broad exploration of the following contexts:
(1) The source of law (or institutional author);
(2) The source's human author(s);
(3) The source's underlying and missing narrative(s); and
(4) The source's purpose.
Even when exploring these traditional sites of legal meaning, whether in Legal
Writing or in Property, slight shifts in discourse can open students'
perspectives. For example, transformative legal analysis requires that students
go beyond traditional notions of legal hierarchy and enacted law versus
common law. As Professor Griffin suggests, while "[t]he very purpose of the
hierarchy of authority is to rank authorities so that some outweigh others," the
hierarchy metaphor is inapt at best and, at worst, is actively detrimental to deep
174. Id. at 62.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 63. Describing a cultural interpretation of law approach to understanding
the Columbine shootings, Mezey suggests inquiring into the laws around school funding,
zoning, mental health care, and law enforcement "and attempt[ing] to make sense of them as
law, and also as metaphor and symbol, understanding them as part of a larger set of social
discourses of which they are an inextricable part." Id.
177. Amy J. Griffin, Dethroning the Hierarchy ofAuthority, 97 OR. L. REv. 51, 93-94
(2018) ("The landscape of authority is not fixed and flat; authority is used differently
depending on factors such as the field of law, the identity of the decisionmaker, the reason
why the legal question is a difficult one, and the amount or quality of mandatory authority on
the issue.").
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legal inquiry and understanding. 178 Rejecting or at least qualifying the
hierarchy metaphor is particularly important in the first year of law school
when students are striving to learn a new language and its many norms and
rules.'79
Rather than perpetuate a dangerous myth that law is neutral and that
lawyers merely need to find the right law and apply it as it has always been
applied, law students should be taught to consider the relative "weight" of
authority along a continuum, and understand that the relative weight of any
given authority can and does change over time.180 Sometimes weight shifts
because of new rules. For example, before the adoption of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, courts could restrict or prohibit citation to
unpublished authority. 181 Such a limitation severely affected the type of
persuasive authority that a lawyer could present to a court. Sometimes weight
shifts because a source gains or loses force. Recent lawsuits evaluating the
import of presidential tweets reflect how changes in human communication and
technology have led to using new sources in legal analysis.
182 Exploring these
weight shifts helps to situate legal analysis in historical and cultural context.
Here, Legal Writing professors can take the lead as they introduce foundational
concepts and help students acclimate to law's discursive structure.
In particular, whether discussing enacted law, executive order, or judicial
decision, students should understand that a "finite group of authors"-both
178. Id. at 60. Professor Griffin notes "[t]he fixed boundaries of mandatory authority
are a bit like political boundaries of a state. On a map, the line between two states appears
perfectly clear-conceptually the boundary is distinct. But on the ground, that line is often
invisible. Every lawyer and law student understands the difference between binding and
nonbinding authority. But on the ground-in the work of building legal arguments-the
distinction is much less clear." Id. at 66-67.
179. Professor Jeff Lipshaw characterizes the mismatch between a law student's desire
for coherent rules and the reality of American law by recalling the classic first-year law
student frustration: "can you just tell me what the rules are?" Lipshaw, supra note 170, at
1032. Lawyers and law professors "know that the question is meaningless: the rules arise in
a clash of instrumental interests in which competing parties assert competing rules that
would dictate competing outcomes, and judges attempt to resolve disputes in a way that
keeps all of those rules coherent and consistent." Id.
180. Griffin, supra note 177, at 63. Griffin explains that "[w]eight, as applied to legal
sources, is not specific; typically, the most that can be said is that one source weighs more or
less than another. Greater and lesser weights make more sense given a continuum of weight,
where the value and persuasiveness of sources are relative. Sources are balanced against one
another, the weight of a source might fall anywhere along the spectrum, and that weight can
change over time." Id. at 92.
181. See id at78; FED.R.APP.P. 32.1.
182. See, e.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 567 (2018)
(noting the parties' joint stipulation states that tweets from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter
account are public records and must be preserved and that the "account has been used in the
course of the appointment of officers (including cabinet secretaries), the removal of officers,
and the conduct of foreign policy"); see also Margolis, supra note 161, at 911 (arguing that
online research is blurring the lines between traditional and non-traditional legal sources).
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institutional and human-have produced the law.1 83 Even though there have
been efforts to diversify voices at the student, lawyer, law professor, and judge
level, the demographics of the legal profession have never reflected the U.S.
polity.1 84 Further, most first-year law professors continue to teach law from a
white, largely male, normative perspective-what Professor KimberI6
Crenshaw has described as "perspectiveless."185 Students are rewarded for
parroting this contrived objectivity. 1 8 6 However, when law professors in a first-
year course acknowledge law's historic and enduring exclusivity, and explore
the four context spheres above, they invite students to question and wrestle
with the law. They also create space for and center students' diverse identities
and experiences.
Similarly, introducing law students to the subjectivity of the law and the
U.S. legal system counters the notion that a neutral body of law exists. Part of
this inquiry includes considering the identity of a particular decision-maker and
how that identity may affect their choice of authority. While the institutional
identity of the decision-maker-for example, Supreme Court versus arbitration
panel-is important, the inquiry should go further. Judges are not just
influenced by sources cited in the briefs before them. 187 They are also
183. Margolis, supra note 161, at 914 ("Traditional legal authority is produced by
lawyers, primarily judges and legal academics, for use by other lawyers, judges, and legal
academics").
184. See ABA Profile of the Legal Profession, American Bar Association (2019)
https://perma.cc/WP4K-FTC8; see generally MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE
AND GENDER IN LEGAL ACADEMIA (2019).
185. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 2; see also Boles, supra note 78, at 221 ("Most
law students are taught from an invisible and assumed perspective that is largely white, male,
heterosexual, economically advantaged, and able-bodied. This assumed perspective forms an
invisible pedagogical norm."); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their
Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263, 314 (2000) ("Not only is legal doctrine developed to obfuscate
the importance of the racial context to entire areas of law, but silence is maintained in
particular disputes. Legal actors-judges, lawyers, scholars, deans, and professors-are
socialized to maintain a decorum that protects this silencing.").
186. See Chase, supra note 154, at 58 (arguing that "contrived stance of objectivity"
validates the cultural perspective of most white students "while the perspectives of rights,
fairness, justice, and equality of many African-American students and professors are seen as
less worthy of serious consideration."); see also Archer, supra note 7 (arguing many law
students view the world through a post-racial lens and this lens dominates social and legal
culture); Angela Onwauchi-Willig, Dean, Boston University School of Law, Welcome
Remarks at the Boston University School of Law Symposium: Racial Bias, Disparities and
Oppression in the IL Curriculum: A Critical Approach to the Canonical First Year Law
School Subject Democracy (Feb. 28, 2020) (on file with author) ("For far too long, what it
has meant to teach students to think like a lawyer has meant that we expect some students to
ignore the realities of their lives, their families' lives, and the lives of those in their
communities-to ignore what is readily visible to them-while reinforcing the privilege that
other students have in keeping those realities invisible.").
187. Bennardo, supra note 22, at 47 (noting that these extralegal issues influencing
decision-making include, but are not limited to, "prejudice based on certain characteristics of
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influenced by culture and their own experiences. iss As Professor Linda
Edwards notes, "there exists no neutral moment-no moment when a judge's
perception is unaffected by one cultural frame or another. ... "9 Instead,
judges rely on a near "limitless batch" of information to inform their
decisions.'90
This "batch" of information encompasses binding authorities as well as a
host of other legal sources.'9 1 Optional legal authorities that law professors
could introduce in their first year courses include legislative history, agency
interpretations, treatises, dictionaries, empirical studies, and "voices briefs."'
92
Such sources help deepen a future lawyer's understanding of the mutually
constitutive relationship between law and culture. Non-legal sources also play
an increasingly important role in both enacted law and judicial decisions.1
93 As
Professor Ellie Margolis explains, a non-legal source is "not explicitly 'about
the law' and not directed at a legal audience but .. . is nonetheless used as
authority in support of legal analysis."'94 Students should be aware that lawyers
and judges do not adhere to specific rules regarding non-legal sources, and they
should be taught to vet those sources with a critical eye.1
95
Finally, students should also understand canons of interpretation and
explore their import beyond a brief introduction in Legal Writing and
the parties or the parties' attorneys, the financial resources of the parties, the publicity
surrounding a case, public opinion, social trends, and on and on").
188. See Edwards, supra note 47, at 58-59 ("There is no such thing as a hermetically
sealed judicial environment.").
189. Id. at 61.
190. See id. at 53.
191. Griffin, supra note 177, at 54; Margolis, supra note 161, at 913-19 (describing
traditional legal authority, which is generally broken into binding (mandatory) authority and
persuasive authority).
192. Edwards, supra note 47, at 34. Edwards defines the term "voices briefs" as
"stories drawn from the lives of individuals who are strangers to the case." This subset of
amicus briefs is a relatively new. Edwards explains, "[t]o date, voices briefs have been used
almost entirely in abortion rights and marriage equality cases. These cases share two
important, overlapping characteristics: (1) the outcome will have a direct personal impact on
the intimate lives of those affected; and (2) the storytellers' experience is likely outside of
the Justices' experience."Id. at 39.
193. Margolis, supra note 161, at 920 (noting the quantity and variety of non-legal
sources cited in legal decisions has increased dramatically).
194. Id. at 919 (arguing as use of non-legal sources becomes more accepted, these
sources "increasingly take on the mantle of authority"). For example, Justice Sotomayor
relied on law review articles, scholarly books, and writing by authors such as W.E.B. Du
Bois, James Baldwin, and Ta-Nehisi Coates to support her dissent in Utah v. Strieff 136 S.
Ct. 2056, 2064-72 (2016). See also Crawford et al., supra note 62, at 186-89 (discussing
Justice Sotomayor's dissent as an example of a legal opinion reflecting feminist theory and
methods).
195. See Griffin, supra note 177, at 85 (noting when it comes to non-legal sources "the
only guard against bias seems to be the adversarial design of the judicial system").
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Constitutional Law courses.1 96 These "never-binding" sources inform judicial
decision-making, which in turn alters the legal landscape in which people and
entities operate. 197 For example, law professors would do well to include
empirical data to show how courts use canons in various ways, and engage
students in thinking about how canons impact specific cases and also affect the
development of the law more generally.198
In order to evaluate the weight of authority in context, students also need to
go beyond the edited appellate decisions that make up the bulk of first-year
casebooks. While many casebooks include selected materials that help students
contextualize the legal concepts they are learning, these heavily curated and
neatly packaged sources do not replicate or prepare students to solve problems
or create value in complex human environments. 199 Indeed, "[a]ppellate
opinions hide, rather than display, how 'facts' are constructed and how more
than one narrative can be consistent with "raw data."200 The transformative
legal analysis framework requires adding depth by uncovering narrative and
including backstories. Adding to law's narrative helps students to contextualize
the law.201 As lawyers, today's law students will confront messy stories, not
pristine legal doctrine. Their law school courses should prepare them for this
196. Id. at 73 ("[C]anons of interpretation, a long-accepted part of statutory
interpretation, have no particular place on the hierarchy of authority but are used for their
status."); see also Charlie D. Stewart, The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New
Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1510-11 (2017) (discussing
State v. Demesme as an example of the "cocktail party" canon of construction, where "plain
meaning" is derived from personal experience).
197. Griffin, supra note 177, at 73-77 (discussing various types of optional authority
and concluding these texts are routinely relied on for their authoritative weight and cited in
judicial decisions).
198. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) (evaluating 632 cases
1969-2003 to see how the Supreme Court uses canons in workplace jurisprudence).
199. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 2, at 604 (suggesting an alternative); Capulong,
supra note 23, at 39-40 (noting that the client encounters in appellate decisions function as
legal categories).
200. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 2; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 187
(observing that the case dialogue method deliberately ignores the "rich complexity of actual
situations that involve full dimensional people").. In the area of contract law, Professor
Deborah Zalesne has argued that judges often omit identifying characteristics of the parties.
She notes that "[d]etails sure to have influenced the judge's legal reasoning and analysis-
such as the relationship between the parties, or the age, race, gender, or class of one or both
of the parties-are conspicuously missing, leaving readers to hypothesize or fill in the gaps."
Deborah Zalesne, Racial Inequality in Contracting: Teaching Race as a Core Value, 3
COLUMBIA J. RACE & L. 25, 29 (2013).
201. See Graham & McJohn, supra note 50, at 258 (noting "narrative plays a
fundamental role in legal reasoning, in such areas as memory, moral decision-making,
reasoning by analogy, explanation, and even the organization of the vast amounts of
information that lawyers contend with."); see also Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions -
Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2006).
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work.
One way to add backstories and thereby fill in the law's narrative is to
introduce students to documents underlying trial court and appellate
decisions.202 Docket entries, such as exhibits and transcripts, reveal competing
stories and illuminate how law is shaped by non-legal sources. For example,
students can compare facts from competing briefs and other supplemental
material to identify which facts were included in an opinion. Where a case
results in judges or justices issuing concurring or dissenting opinions, students
can parse and wrestle with the implications of those drafting decisions.
203
Professors teaching required first-year courses can also supplement their
traditional casebooks with selections from the Feminist Judgments series.
20
These "shadow decisions" rely on precedents in effect at the time of the
original opinion and use only established facts from the case record, yet reach a
different conclusion from the original decision.
205 Using "shadow judgments"
in combination with Supreme Court decisions "concretely demonstrate[s] that
202. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 2 (noting appellate "opinions state 'the facts.'
Even when encountered with contrasting statements by a dissent, these factual statements do
little to equip students to navigate overlapping and diverging witness accounts, gaps in
forensic material, disputes over significance levels in statistical studies, or the influence ofa
narrative frame").
203. For example, the case history from Bell v. Itawamba County School Board
demonstrates how complex narratives, legal frameworks, and cognitive biases affect legal
decisions. In that case, 17-year old Taylor Bell sued his school, the principal, and others in
the Northern District of Mississippi for suspending him and placing him in an alternative
educational facility for writing and publishing on Facebook and YouTube a rap that alleged
sexual misconduct by faculty at his public school and used explicit and violent imagery.
Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836-37 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
Documents filed by Bell in support of summary judgment reveal that after an initial
disciplinary hearing the school board's Disciplinary Committee found there wasn't
conclusive evidence that Taylor's rap could be construed as a threat. See Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment, Bell, 1:11-cv-00056, Ex. 8. After the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that Bell's off-campus speech was not protected
by the First Amendment because it caused a material school disruption that was reasonably
foreseeable, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd, 774 F.3d 280, 304
(5th Cir. 2014). The majority concluded that "the summary-judgment evidence and 
materials
establish that Bell composed and recorded his rap song completely off campus; that he used
his home computer to post it on the Internet during non-school hours; and that the School
Board did not demonstrate that Bell's song caused a substantial disruption of school work or
discipline, or that school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a disruption." Id. at
282. Compelled by the then-recent school shooting at Sandy Hook and the near-universal use
of social media, the dissenting opinion concluded that the First Amendment did not protect
Bell's off-campus speech because "an objectively reasonable person would interpret the rap
recording as a true threat" and because Bell's speech could be regulated under the Tinker
substantial disruption test. Id. at 315, 322-24 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). After rehearing en
banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in an opinion written by Judge
Barksdale. Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
204. Crawford et al., supra note 62, at 180.
205. Id. at 181.
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the development of the law or the outcome of a lawsuit is not inevitable or
predetermined, whether one is talking about constitutional interpretation or
statutory analysis."206
Finally, students should become attuned to missing facts, voices, and
stories and understand the impact that procedural rules have on them. For
example, while first-year students generally take Civil Procedure, they may
memorize the operative rules without understanding why they exist or how they
order the chapters in a litigation story.2 0 7 Yet these rules, like those in Evidence
and Criminal Procedure, govern which facts are deemed important and which
are suppressed. They not only impact the development of the law, but they also
determine how and whether certain stories are told. 208 As a result, these rules
affect the "legal imagination."209 Professors Todd Rakoff and Martha Minow
describe the legal imagination as "the ability to generate the multiple
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways and multiple solutions,
to which [law students] could apply their well-honed analytic skills."2 1 0
Rather than focusing solely on procedural rules or appellate decisions,
students should also be taught how to select, evaluate, and explore law's
sources and the narratives that impact them. Students can engage more fully
with transformational legal analysis by going beyond law's immediate sources
to consider its social and cultural contexts. This will help students become
archaeologists of the lawyering process, more adept at determining what the
law is, and at articulating visions of what the law could and even should be.2 1 1
The Subpart below suggests how to approach this work.
206. Id. at 180.
207. See RUTHANNE ROBBINS ET AL., YOUR CLIENT'S STORY: PERSUASIVE LEGAL
WRITING 39 (2019) (using the phrase "chapters in a litigation story" to explain the lifecycle
of a case).
208. See Ralph, supra note 65, at 584-85 (describing the process by which law
determines which stories are told); see also Bennett Capers, Evidence without Rules, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 867 (2018) (discussing the effect of un-governed "other
evidence"-like race, attire, and presence of family members in attendance at trial-on case
outcomes); Barbara A. Babcock, Toni M. Massaro & Norman W. Spaulding, The Ideal and
the Actual in Procedural Due Process, in Coleman, Malveaux, Porter & Pedro, A CRITICAL
GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (calling on scholars to
reconceptualize how procedure is taught and practiced by focusing on how procedure both
works for and fails ordinary people).
209. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 2, at 602.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 607. Rakoff and Minow caution that without introducing students to the
messy, open-ended problems people face beginning in the first year-to challenge them in
this way-"students will learn to think of the legal system as only so many rooms, so many
pieces of furniture, that they can never reorder." Id
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2. Excavating law's socio-cultural context
Transformative legal analysis situates law's socio-cultural contexts in the
center of legal pedagogy. It asks law students to analyze the law and the legal
system from a variety of perspectives and to consider what these perspectives
add to their analysis. Doing so prepares law students to engage in self-reflective
law practice and conscious professional identity development. Currently, the
type of legal analysis that is taught in most first-year law courses stops at legal
text. As the previous Subpart notes, first-year students are taught to decipher
what the law says-to find a legal rule-often by extracting legal principles
from a handful of sources.2 12 But competent lawyering requires more. As a
result, transformative legal analysis asks the law student and future lawyer to
look into the human environment in which law operates and to evaluate law
and its effects from the perspective of the people who it regulates, defines, and
impacts.
Like the work involved with investigating law's sources, excavating law's
social and cultural contexts requires a primary understanding of the core
concepts from social and cognitive science that impact how people come to
understand and make sense of information. Class discussions of how humans
make subconscious and conscious assumptions will help to destigmatize critical
conversations about law, legal reasoning, and legal systems.
213 When law
students and lawyers are able to identify and unpack assumptions, they deepen
their critical thinking and analysis. The list of potential differences (and
similarities) that can complicate and impair lawyering is infinite.
214 Because
people experience information differently, two individuals can look at the same
information and apply different metaphors.
In addition to assigned readings and class discussions, professors can
introduce simple exercises throughout the first year to help students understand
that their brains use schemas and mapping rules for everything. For example,
asking students to define terms like home, mammal, and garbage will trigger
different images and associations.215 Inviting students to experience the
212. Margolis, supra note 161, at 913 ("In their legal research and writing classes, law
students are taught how to find and use authority to analyze issues and form legal
arguments."). For sample texts explaining how to find a legal rule see David Romantz &
Kathleen Elliot Vinson, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL (2009); Christine
Coughlin et al., A LAWYER WRITES (2018).
213. See e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 73, at 391-96 (providing clinic seminar
exercises to explore how sameness and difference affect individual relationships and the
legal system).
214. Casey Schutte, Mandating Cultural Competence Training for Dependency
Attorneys, 52 FAM. CT. REv. 564, 566 (2014) (noting, at a minimum, there are differences in
age, development, educational level, gender, language, national origin, religion, sexual
orientation, disability, neighborhood and family structure).
215. HSBC's "Local Knowledge" marketing campaign provides numerous visuals
professors can use to jumpstart the conversation. A simple Google image search results in
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diversity of associations within a classroom and then think about how such
results might impact the lawyer/client and even lawyer/supervisor relationship
will enable them to understand that culture and cognition shape how people
encounter and understand information. This reality is as true for the law student
as it is for the judge or the client, or the juror, or the witness, or the parties to a
contract. Associational exercises can quickly expose this mental process and
lay the foundation for more careful, nuanced, and creative legal analysis.
While cognitive and narrative theory are often included in Legal Writing
courses when discussing persuasive advocacy, their role in making and
interpreting law is equally important. As a result, concepts from these
disciplines such as schema, master narrative, and ethos/pathos/logos hould be
included in Legal Writing courses at every stage of legal problem solving,
which includes critical reading, rule synthesis, legal analysis, and overall
prediction. Additionally, other first-year professors can build and strengthen the
foundation laid by Legal Writing professors by pulling these concepts into their
courses, which helps students to scaffold and deploy the knowledge they are
acquiring. For example, Contracts professors can help students understand that
a contract represents an artifact of a transactional lifecycle. 216 The contract
came from somewhere. Its lifecycle began as the subjective desires of each
party and those desires at some point became an agreement-there was a
meeting of the minds. These subjective desires, the contract itself, and the law
that will determine the result of any later dispute all rely on communicating
with language across various cultures and contexts.217 Understanding the
master narratives and schemas in a contract's transactional lifecycle helps to
reveal the subjective nature of legal analysis and unpack power dynamics, both
among contracting parties and in relation to the development of contract law
more generally.
Next, courses should include the human environment. While some
traditional first-year podium courses may incorporate how cultural context and
individual cognition impact the stories that get told and the legal decisions that
result, often the people, entities, and institutions that law affects-the sphere of
images ranging from three different "footballs" (football/USA; soccer/UEA;
rugby/Australia) to the same small rug with the terms: "d6cor," "souvenir," and "place of
prayer." See also Jeffry Pilcher, HSBC 'Different Points of Value,' FIN. BRAND (July 6,
2009), https://perma.cc/5DDU-ZZYN (describing campaign and including image samples).
216. See Lipshaw, supra note 170 (arguing for teaching students contract law by
exploring metaphor, prototypical frames, and the lifecycle journey of a contract).
217. See Zalesne, supra note 200, at 35 (noting that "[fjactors such as ethnicity and
national origin can play a major role in contract formation and interpretation. The unique
experiences and vocabularies of different communities can affect individual business
practices and therefore can affect the subjective intent of parties entering into a contract");
see also Chase, supra note 154, at 39-40 (arguing that "[t]he effect of the historical treatment
of African-Americans as property and as the subject of contracts undoubtedly has affected
the white perception and attitudes towards African-Americans and contracts").
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reception-remain curiously absent.
218 Casebooks filled with summaries and
excerpted decisions can gloss over the main characters and disguise the life of
the law. Even in first-year "lawyering" or "skills" courses, the fact patterns are
often carefully curated, stripped of the discursive interplay between law and the
people and spaces it regulates.219 When considering context-and especially
when finding, evaluating, and using facts-students should understand that
they already have categories or schema for the material they are encountering
and have also likely developed a perspective. This is not good or bad, it simply
is. As Professor Linda Edwards notes, "[t]he question is not whether we see the
situation through a lens, but which lens focuses our view. The danger is, of
course, that we are often oblivious to our own unconscious frames."
220
Interweaving discourse and critical legal theory into teaching legal analysis
in the first-year curriculum is one way to encourage law students to read both
the law and the facts in context.221 This skill is particularly important because
creating, interpreting, and applying the law occurs in a space of translation
between author and audience. When students understand law as discourse-as
a way of explaining, regulating, and understanding social events and ideas-
they can evaluate how courts and legislatures construct an argument, or
"encode," as they interact with law and culture.
222 At the same time, they can
consider how people and institutions perceive the 
law, or "decode." 223
218. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 2, at 602 (noting that students "most crucially
lack. . . the ability to generate the multiple characterizations, multiple versions, multiple
pathways, and multiple solutions, to which they could apply their very well honed analytic
skills"). For a discussion of how to place legal doctrine in context in a first-year Contracts
class see Lipshaw, supra note 170.
219. See Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching Legal Research and
Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education into the First Year, 12
CLINICAL L. REV. 441, 454-58 (2006) (describing the "canned" legal hypothetical as "a
highly simplified environment, free of many of the complications of practice" where the
"'question' for the students is defined by the pre-determined 'answer'" and there are a
"limited number of pathways for the students to follow"); Ann Shalleck, Constructions ofthe
Client within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1733-39 (1993) (discussing how
various law school classes rely on a one-dimensional, constructed client to avoid the
ambiguities and complexities of "real" clients); see also L. Danielle Tully, Collaborative
Case Developmentfor the First-Year Legal Writing Problem, 31 THE SECOND DRAFT 3, 3
(2018) (explaining a method for engaging first-year students in developing their simulated
case file).
220. Edwards, supra note 47, at 61.
221. For an example of applying critical cultural theory to policing and depolicing see
Cooper, supra note 63.
222. Cooper, supra note 64, at 858-61 (describing encoding of discourse as the
"construction of an argument" and suggesting when we analyze encoding we "break[] apart
the structure of the discourse to see why its building blocks were combined in a certain
way").
223. See id. at 861-64 (describing decoding a discourse and explaining that an audience
can read discourse consistent with the dominant position (in the way its author intended) or
in an oppositional position (in a way its author never intended)).
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Understanding how socio-cultural context impacts encoding and decoding
provides students with critical perspective on how their clients interpret, use,
and exist within legal frameworks. Sometimes law has a profound regulating
effect on behavior. Other times, like with the laws that regulate speed limit on
roadways, culture has more influence than the formal rule.2 24
Including backstories and counter-narratives, like those mentioned in the
previous Subpart, also injects a dose of context into the first-year curriculum. It
helps students understand that facts in a decision do not necessarily tell the
entire story. At the same time, these facts are essential to the case's narrative,
and that narrative is situational.2 2 5 For example, in her article Law as Culture,
Professor Mezey recounts an example first proposed by philosopher Gilbert
Ryle and then employed by Clifford Geertz to explain the import of culture to
interpretation. She asks: What is the difference between an unintended twitch
of the eye and a wink?226 In order to understand whether an eye movement is
voluntary or involuntary, an observer must do more than read the mere
physiological description of the movement itself. Rather, to make sense of the
movement the observer must also understand "the social codes that give it
meaning as a twitch, a wink, a fake-wink, a parody of a wink, a rehearsal of a
wink, etc." 22 7 As Professor Robert Cover argued: "j]ust as the meaning of law
is determined by our interpretive commitments, so also can many of our actions
be understood only in relation to a norm." 228 He explained, "[t]here is a
difference between sleeping late on Sunday and refusing the sacraments,
between having a snack and desecrating the fast of Yom Kippur, between
banking a check and refusing to pay your income tax. In each case, an act
signifies something new and powerful when we understand the act is in
reference to a norm." 229 Moving beyond description to interpretation, the
observer must understand, or read, the social and cultural contexts.230 This
"reading" is core to transformative legal analysis.
224. See Mezey, supra note 29, at 52-53. Describing analysis conducted by legal
scholars on speed limits, Mezey argues "the de facto 'legal' speed limit[] is the limit set by
the conventions of drivers-conventions which vary depending on the stretch of road, the
time of day, the prevailing conditions, or the habits of a particular city or geographic region."
Id. at 52. Additionally, she states, "[t]he color of one's car, or more important still, the color
of one's skin, will change the legally enforced speed limit and traffic laws generally." Id. at
53.
225. See Ralph, supra note 65, at 577 (discussing events recounted in Walker v. City of
Birmingham and Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham and noting the Supreme Court created
two distinct narratives of the same event for different purposes).
226. Mezey, supra note 29, at 60.
227. Id.
228. ROBERT COVER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 99 (1995).
229. Id. at 99-100.
230. See Montoya, supra note 185, at 274-77 (exploring silence as a communicative
device and situating its meaning within culture).
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Exploring backstories and counter-narratives also situates law within
history and supports culturally responsive lawyering because it demonstrates
the dynamic nature of legal norms. Some examples illustrate this point. When
studying the law of discrimination, students should understand that it developed
in tandem with the scientific theory that "individuals were aware of their biases
and prejudices, and accordingly that discrimination was manifested in overt,
express ways." 2 31 Subsequent developments in the fields of psychology and
cognitive science complicate the law's landscape and provide new avenues for
both understanding and critiquing legislation, case law, and regulations
governing discrimination. When learning about restrictive covenants in
Property, students should understand the socio-historic context that supported
their widespread use and its lasting consequences on housing and education.
Students could be introduced to recent work by Professor Richard Rothstein,
which deftly demonstrates how the enduring legacy of racial segregation is
intentionally created, supported, and sustained by local, state, and national
law.232 Similarly, in Constitutional Law, students should understand that the
recognition of marriage equality and an individual right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment reflect not only legal changes, but also profound social
transformations that resulted from the complex mutually constitutive
relationship between law and culture.2
33 The law's history is ripe with stories to
demonstrate this critical point: socio-cultural context matters.
Including both theory and the socio-cultural context does not water down
or detract from teaching core legal concepts. Rather, including them throughout
the curriculum-not simply in specialized elective courses-helps students to
develop nimble problem-solving skills and prepares them to meet the
multidimensional demands of competent law practice. 234 This foundation
supports the third tenet of culturally responsive lawyering.
C. Employing Inter-Cultural Sensibility
When legal education and law practice situate culture at the heart of legal
inquiry, employing transformative legal analysis in the provision of culturally
sensible legal services embodies culturally responsive lawyering.
The cultural sensibility framework proposed by Professors Curcio, Ward,
and Dogra focuses on students' understanding that "culture is a complex
231. Bassett, supra note 50, at 1574.
232. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
233. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (discussing marriage equality and right to bear arms).
234. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, What's Going On: The Psychoanalysis Metaphor for
Educating Lawyer-Counselors Essay, 45 CoNN. L. REv. 1355, 1355 (2013) (arguing lawyers
need to be interdisciplinary theorists to understand "what's going on").
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compilation of numerous influences and emphasizes developing students'
understanding of how culture, in turn, influences interactions or knowledge."235
Importantly, the cultural sensibility framework acknowledges that cultural
experiences impact the interpretation, application, and communication of facts
and law. 236 At its core, cultural sensibility promotes curiosity, humility, and
open-mindedness.237 It "emphasizes self-reflection and treats each person as an
expert on his or her own cultural experience(s)."238 Additionally, cultural
sensibility acknowledges that cultural experiences and understanding vary over
a person's lifetime.239 As a result, culturally responsive lawyering, much like a
lawyer's duty of competence, requires an ongoing commitment to self-
reflection, inquiry, and growth.
Currently, most law students who encounter curriculum on cultural
sensibility do so in the second or third year of law school when they participate
in a legal clinic. While a well-designed and supervised clinic experience is
invaluable for developing competent lawyering skills, imagine the potential for
student growth if the entire legal education supported a student's first client
representation. In such a scenario, the student would be applying concepts and
skills honed over two years of large lecture, small seminar, and simulation-
based courses. Alongside the core concepts and skills associated with
transformative legal analysis, students should be exposed to and begin to
cultivate the professional values, attitudes, and skills undergirding inter-cultural
sensibility from the first day of law school.
As discussed previously, clinical scholars have developed both theoretical
and practical models for teaching cultural sensibility in their clinics and a full
summary is beyond the scope of this article.2 40 Some of the models and
exercises for teaching cultural sensibility are easily adapted to other courses
outside the clinical experience. For example, consistent with the proposed
learning outcomes above, Legal Writing, first-year podium, Professional
Responsibility, and other non-clinical experiential courses should include
professional identity development as a core learning outcome. In courses
outside of the clinical setting, professional identity development should include
engaging students in developing self-awareness through frequent self-
assessment and reflections. This could include asking students to think about
235. Curcio et al., supra note 128, at 189.
236. Id. at 191-92; see also Chopp, supra note 34, at 370.
237. Curcio et al., supra note 128, at 189.
238. Chopp, supra note 34, at 367.
239. See Curcio et al., supra note 128, at 188 (noting that cultural sensibility
"account[s] for the fact that cultural experiences vary over our lifetimes and . .. encourage[s]
students to continuously [] examine whether their own worldviews or beliefs might need to
shift").
240. For an extensive list of learning outcomes supporting the cultural sensibility
framework, see id.
how their own identity and experiences impact their reaction to and
understanding of the material they are encountering.
2 41 In a Legal Writing
course, this may include asking students to read The Five Habits and walk
through some of the exercises.242 While addressed to clinical professors looking
to support students in building cross-cultural competence, the exercises in this
seminal text could be adapted to any law school classroom. For example,
students in first-year Legal Writing courses often represent a fictional client
and engage in a client interviewing simulation. 
24 3 In preparation for the
simulation, students can be asked to complete an exercise based on "Habit 1:
Degree of Separation and Connection."244 Here, students can identify the
similarities and differences between themselves and their clients. They can then
brainstorm how these similarities and differences might impact the
lawyer/client relationship-from issue-spotting and fact gathering to client
communication and legal drafting.
Certainly, there are limits to such an exercise in simulated "client" settings.
As Professors Capulong and Shallek have each noted, simulated clients can
never adequately capture human complexity. 245 Acknowledging these
limitations, law professors should be transparent with students about what they
can and should learn from casebooks, simulated exercises, and actual-client
representation. For example, unpacking assumptions around sameness is
particularly important for first-year law students who are developing their
issue-spotting and problem-solving skills in both podium and Legal Writing
courses.246 As Professor Alexis Anderson notes, "assumptions attributed to
sameness can complicate lawyering. . . [U]ntested assumptions, whatever
their source, can impair lawyering judgments."
247 One strategy that professors
can employ in any type of course is to challenge students to make the familiar
strange. Using this sociological concept, students should move beyond
241. Weng, supra note 73, at 386; Zawisza, supra note 33, at 232 (asking students to
reflect on an assumption of theirs that "proved to be untrue"); Anderson et al., supra note 73,
at 386.
242. See Bryant, supra note 73; see also Bryant & Koh Peters, supra note 36.
243. See e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis & James Webb, Learning from Dramatized
Outcomes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1146,1151-52 (2019).
244. Bryant & Koh Peters, supra note 36, at 51. For suggestions on applying The Five
Habits in large first-year required courses, see Mikah K. Thompson, Toward a Pedagogy of
Self-Awareness in the First-Year Law School Classroom, CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION (forthcoming), https://perma.cc/QTR2-PQ92.
245. See Capulong, supra note 23, at 41-42 (noting that "because it is impossible to
simulate social circumstances fully and dynamically, simulated clients are bounded and are
replete with individual, not social, detail"); Shalleck, supra note 23, at 1733 (noting that
simulated clients are stripped of extraneous features because they are created to serve pre-
existing legal frameworks).
246. Anderson et al., supra note 73 (noting challenge of addressing sameness for
clinical students).
247. Id. at 341.
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"common-sense" conclusions that are grounded in their own social reality and
attempt to describe, interpret, and evaluate events and people from different
perspectives. When discussing a case-such as one relying on concepts like the
"reasonable person" or "apparent authority"-students can be asked to consider
whether identity, cultural background, or other considerations impact such
determinations.248 As part of this inquiry, taking a transformative legal analysis
approach, students can investigate sources that explore the socio-cultural
contexts in which these legal rules were developed.24 9 This type of perspective-
taking can be used when reading appellate decisions or when representing a
fictional client. Exercises like this help students to experience law's
subjectivity. And practicing this skill throughout law school will help students
to prepare to competently represent clients.2 50
When integrated throughout the law school curriculum, students will begin
to understand that professional identity development is critical for both learning
and practicing the law. They will come to understand that "a lawyer's
multicultural knowledge, intercultural communication skills, and cultural
sensitivity are often the keys to avoiding misunderstanding and promoting
effective problem solving."251 Finally, teaching students to consciously reflect
on how perceptions of difference and sameness affect their lawyering practices
will result in attorneys who are more agile and ethical in a pluralistic society
and will inspire them to build a judicial system that is more just and equitable.
248. For a simple, engaging addition to a discussion on "reasonable person," include
the podcast: "Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man." Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man,
MORE PERFECT (2017), https://perma.cc/V3L3-R393. For suggestions on discussing "implied
consent" in Torts, see Thompson, supra note 244. Professor Osamudia James uses a brief
classroom exercise in her Torts course to help her students understand how race shapes the
construction of the reasonable person standard and to understand that engagement with core
legal concepts is not neutral. She asks her students to close their eyes and picture the
reasonable person. She asks: who is this person? What do they look like? Where do they
live? How do they move around the world? Students then open their eyes and she asks a
series of questions about who or what they conjured. Osamudia James, Professor, University
of Miami Law School, Presentation at the Boston University School of Law Symposium:
Racial Bias, Disparities and Oppression in the IL Curriculum: A Critical Approach to the
Canonical First Year Law School Subjects (Feb. 28, 2020) (remarks on file with author).
249. For example, professors could assign law review articles or book chapters to
contextualize and ground the cases they read. See, e.g., Ann McGinley, Reasonable Men?,
45 CONN. L. REv. 1 (2012) (discussing the reasonable person standard in negligence law and
Title VII); Lucy Jewel, Does the Reasonable Man Have an Obsessive Compulsive Disorder?
54 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1049 (2019) (exploring the cultural and legal attributes of the
reasonable man); Martha Chamallas, MEASURE OF INJURY, 119-53 (exploring how omission
bias, normality bias, and fundamental attribution error negatively affects marginalized tort
plaintiffs).
250. See Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 24
(2011) (noting that moral imagination arises through "the effort to understand the
perspectives of others").
251. See Lynch, supra note 81, at 136.
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IV. CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE LAWYERING APPLIED
While a full exploration of Mr. Dernesme's story is beyond the scope of
this article, returning to the opening scene and sketching a possible pathway
forward will help to ground the preceding pages. Did he ask for an attorney?
Should anything he said after he made the statement be suppressed in his
criminal trial? What do the answers to these questions say about what the law
is? What, if anything, do they say about what the law should be? This Part
illustrates how using the culturally responsive lawyering framework might
impact Mr. Demesme's case and provides suggestions for its use in a law
school course.
The court reporter transcribed Mr. Demesme's statement as follows:
"If y'all, this is how Ifeel, ify'all think I did it, I know that I didn't
do it so why don't you just give me a lawyer dog cause this is not
what's up."252
Like the eye movement-a twitch or wink-Mr. Demesme's statement to
two police officers during a custodial interrogation might be understood in
numerous ways. But where would you start? First, acknowledge that law and
culture exist in a mutually constitutive relationship. For Mr. Demesme's story,
this means that before he spoke those words, he existed in the world, his life,
and how he understood the world were influenced by his experiences, which is
to say: he existed in culture(s). The rules being applied to Mr. Demesme, those
that he allegedly broke and those governing his interactions with law
enforcement, also existed within and were informed by culture. Finally, you the
law student or lawyer, imbued with multiple identities and shaped by
experience, will process all of the materials in this case through the cognitive
architecture that has been building itself in your brain since you were born.
Some of that architecture will process information consciously and you will be
aware of its working. Much of that architecture will process information
subconsciously. That's the starting point: law and stories come from
somewhere and your perception of both is subjective.
Then what? Before situating the legal sources that might govern this case,
heighten your self-awareness. Consider how your identity and experiences
influence the choices you make in legal research, issue spotting, case analysis
and client communication. What are your initial thoughts on the case? For
some, you may think that Mr. Demesme asked for a lawyer, and that his request
was clear. If you think this, why? What supports your conclusion? For others,
you may think that Mr. Demesme didn't ask for a lawyer, or that he asked but
then kept answering questions so he must not have really wanted one. If you
think this, why? What supports your conclusion?
Next, as you investigate legal sources, consider the role that state and
252. State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d. 1206, 1206 (La. 2017).
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federal law play in this scenario. The Supreme Court of Louisiana will apply its
own substantive and procedural precedents along with the Supreme Court's
Fifth Amendment protections. Here, Mr. Demesme petitioned the Louisiana
Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to review the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress and the intermediate appellate court's subsequent writ
denial. Can the Louisiana Supreme Court take the case? Should it? What rules
will the court apply? What level of error must Mr. Demesme demonstrate?
Which way do these scales tip? Which way should they?
When considering Mr. Demesme's Fifth Amendment argument, start with
the text of the Fifth Amendment, and consider the Supreme Court decisions in
Miranda v. Arizona, Edwards v. Arizona, and Davis v. United States. For
context, understand the dilemma the Supreme Court faced in this series of
cases. On the one hand, prior to Miranda, coercive custodial interrogation
practices routinely resulted in questionable confessions.253 Some of those
custodial practices were so brutal and intimidating that they "effectively
infringed on the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."254 On
the other hand, the government has an interest in interrogating criminal
suspects. This history, steeped in both racism and subjugation, helps to ground
the law's various purposes.
Think about how Supreme Court in Davis added to the Fifth Amendment
story. There, it said that in order for an investigation to cease, the suspect must
"at a minimum, [make] some statement that can reasonably be construed to be
an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney."255 Statements that
reference an attorney, but are "ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that they
suspect might be invoking an attorney," do not require ceasing the
interrogation.256 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has interpreted Davis to
mean that Louisiana courts should evaluate facts on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether a suspect made the request with "sufficient clarity."257 What
"facts" matter in this case? How do you know they matter? Are there facts that
might not matter but should? What does "sufficient clarity" sound like? What
does it look like? When you read the Louisiana cases, question your hunches
and the way that you justify the similarity or differences between their facts and
those in Mr. Demesme's case.
While investigating the sources of authority that impact the outcome in Mr.
Demesme's case, consider the justices and judges who wrote key opinions.
Consider the sources they cite and the types of arguments that might have
253. Mezey, supra note 29, at 55.
254. Id.
255. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).
2 5 6. Id.
257. State v. Payne, 833 So. 2d 927, 938 (La. 2002).
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influenced them at the time. Pay attention to whether they rely on a canon of
construction to support their decisions. Do they rely on the same canon in
similar cases? Would using a different canon render a different result? Consider
also the facts in each case, consider what is present and what might be missing.
Ask yourself whether those facts change your analysis. Also consider whether
the cases you are relying on could have come out differently using the same
facts and precedent and think about how this answer might influence your
analysis.
Next, look beyond the law's source and consider the socio-cultural
context-for the law and for Mr. Demesme. The stories you surface will reveal
that law and culture had been busy creating meaning and constructing one
another long before Mr. Demesme said: so why don't you get me a lawyer. The
Miranda warning and the attendant rule from Edwards requiring that
interrogations cease once a custodial suspect invokes the right to an attorney by
requesting one, also became part of popular culture.
258 They "found [their] way
not only into police stations, but into television stations, movies, children's
games, as well as the popular imagination of Americans and foreigners alike.
259
Consider how the rules' operation in the popular imagination, and perhaps even
in Mr. Demesme's own experiences, might have influenced how he expressed
himself in that interrogation room. Would Mr. Demesme's literacy level,
education, mental health or other factors affect your thinking?
Then, consider what happens to your analysis if you change up the syntax,
or even word choice?
What if Mr. Demesme said this:
"Ify'all (pause). This is how Ifeel. Ify'all think I did it, I know that I
didn't do it. So why don't youjust give me a lawyer, dawg, cause this
is not what's up.'260
Or this?
"Ifrou? This is how I feel. Ifyou think I did it, I know that I didn't do
it. So why don't you give me a lawyer because you are wrong.
Or this?
"Just give me a lawyer."261
Take a step back and consider how your initial hunch has changed. Are you
more or less certain? Why? And, how do you feel about this certainty? How
258. Mezey, supra note 29, at 55; see also Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening
the Law: Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 91, 95
(2005) (noting that many Americans' dominant perspective of the law and legal institutions
comes from their representation in popular culture and this influences "collective
expectations, societal myths and the national psyche").
259. Mezey, supra note 29, at 55.
260. Cf Demesme, 228 So. 3d. at 1206.
261. Petition at 9, Demesme. Mr. Demesme's attorney argued in his motion and in
subsequent petitions that these were the operative words.
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might this feeling affect your case planning, decision-making, and client
representation? How might it change what you think the law should be?
The avenues to consider in Mr. Demesme's case are nearly limitless, and
the paragraphs above only scratch the surface. But they also represent
something powerful-something captured by the media storm Justice
Crichton's concurrence sparked after he decided "[i]n [his] view, the
defendant's ambiguous reference to a 'lawyer dog' does not constitute an
invocation of counsel," 262 a view which has no support in Louisiana or
Supreme Court precedent.2 63 Teaching future lawyers and judges about culture,
cognition, and context matters.
CONCLUSION
"For it is important that awake people be awake, or a breaking line may
discourage them back to sleep; the signals we give-yes or no, or
maybe-should be clear: the darkness around us is deep. "264
Although social cognition and culture work have emerged in some legal
corners, these concepts can no longer be buried in scholarship or largely siloed
in "Law +" or in experiential courses. If law schools continue with this
approach, they will send the message that these concepts and skills are
peripheral to legal education and practice.
Certainly, the changes proposed here may seem daunting. Faculty members
might feel that this framework is inconsistent with their teaching or course
plan. As Part IV illustrates, the culturally responsive lawyering framework
requires professors to dedicate syllabus space and class time to dynamic
spheres of inquiry. There will be no simple answers. Law professors may feel
ill-equipped to teach and assess students on cultural responsiveness, especially
since few law professors were trained to be culturally sensible lawyers.2 6 5 The
danger is the perpetuation of "empty, abstract, and ill-educated efforts to meet a
rather lofty and elusive goal."2 66 Law faculty are right to be cautious when
adopting new trainings and curricula, especially in these critical areas where a
decontextualized approach to teaching about culture risks reification.
But cognition and culture influence every aspect of human interaction.
They inform how people perceive, evaluate, and communicate information. It is
time for legal institutions and law professors to embrace their import for legal
education. Even though the newest changes to the ABA Standards do not
262. Demesme, 228 So. 3d. at 1207.
263. See Hebert, supra note 15, at 7-8.
264. WILLIAM STAFFORD, A Ritual to Read to Each Other, in THE WAY IT Is: NEW AND
SELECTED POEMS 42 (1998).
265. See Boles, supra note 78, at 224.
266. Id
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explicitly require law schools to ensure their graduates demonstrate any
competency with these concepts, law faculty should take this opportunity to
rethink legal curricula-and to adopt new approaches that prepare law students
to practice law ethically, promote justice, and improve the legal profession.
Adopting the tenets of culturally responsive lawyering will help them do just
that.
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